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Abstract We prove the security of theoretical quantum key distribution against
the most general attacks which can be performed on the channel, by an eavesdrop-
per who has unlimited computation abilities, and the full power allowed by the
rules of classical and quantum physics. A key created that way can then be used to
transmit secure messages such that their security is also unaffected in the future.
Key words Quantum key distribution, Quantum information, Information vs.
disturbance, Quantum Security, BB84.
⋆ A shortened version of this paper is published in STOC’2000, and a preliminary full
version appears on the Los-Alamos archive http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9912053 [6].
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1 Introduction
Quantum key distribution [3,2] uses the power of quantum mechanics to suggest
the distribution of a key that is secure against an adversary with unlimited compu-
tation power. Such a task is beyond the ability of classical information processing;
thus, it is the main success of the original idea of Wiesner [34] who suggested
using quantum mechanics to perform cryptographic tasks. The extra power gained
by the use of quantum bits (quantum two-level systems, “qubits”) is due to the fact
that the state of such a system cannot be cloned. [Of course, one could use higher
level quantum systems as well.] On the other hand, the security of conventional
key distribution is based on the (unproven) existence of various one-way func-
tions, and mainly on the difficulty of factoring large numbers, a problem which
is assumed to be difficult for a classical computer, and is proven to be easy for a
hypothetical quantum computer [32].
The quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme considered in our work is the
protocol of Bennett and Brassard [3], known as the BB84 protocol. The legitimate
users of this (actually, of any) QKD protocol are conventionally called Alice (the
sender) and Bob (the receiver). Their aim is to create and share a secret key.
There are several classes of attacks (see for instance [8,7]) on quantum key
distribution that can be performed by an eavesdropper having full control of the
channel. The simplest ones are known as individual-particle attacks [17] in which
the transmitted qubits are attacked separately, so that the eavesdropper can be left
with some optimal classical information about each transmitted quantum bit. The
eavesdropper can use this classical information in order to learn some information
about the final secret key. In contrast, in the most general attack called the “joint
attack”, all transmitted quantum particles are attacked together, and the eavesdrop-
per’s goal is to learn as much information as possible about the final key, rather
than about each transmitted qubit. A special class of the joint attack, the “collec-
tive attack” [8] was shown to provide more information to the eavesdropper than
an individual-particle attack [5]. We further explain the differences between the
individual-particle attacks, the collective attacks, and the most general attacks (the
joint attacks) in Subsection 2.2, when we describe the two steps of Eve’s attack.
Various proofs of security were previously obtained against collective attacks [8,9,
7,29] (which is a most important subclass of the joint attack), and we continue this
line of research here to prove the ultimate security of QKD, against any attack (un-
der the conventional assumptions of theoretical QKD, as explained below). Note
that the eavesdropper is assumed to have unlimited technology (e.g., unlimited
computing power, a quantum memory, a quantum computer), while the legitimate
users use practical tools (or more precisely, simplifications of practical tools). Such
assumptions are required since the aim of the invention of quantum key distribu-
tion is to obtain a practical key distribution scheme, which is proven secure against
any attack, even one which is far from being practical with current technology.
To prove security against such a super-strong eavesdropper, conventionally
called Eve, we develop some important technical tools and we reach some novel
results: We obtain a new information versus disturbance result, where the power of
quantum information theory is manifested in an intuitive and clear way. We show
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explicitly how the randomness of the choice of bases, and the randomness of the
choice of test-bits provides the desired security of QKD. We adopt and generalize
sophisticated tools invented in [7]: “Purifications” which simplify Eve’s states, a
bound on accessible information (using Trace-Norm-Difference of density matri-
ces) which avoids any complicated optimization of Eve’s possible measurements,
and a connection between Eve’s accessible information and the error-rate she in-
duces. We add some more simplifications (which were not required in the analysis
of collective attacks in [7]): a reduction to a scheme in which all qubits are used
by Alice and Bob, and a symmetrization of Eve’s attack.
This paper complements the result of Bennett, Mor, and Smolin [5]: That pa-
per shows that individual particle attacks are strictly weaker (less informative to
the eavesdropper) than joint attacks1, and the current paper shows that security can
still be obtained even when the eavesdropper applies the strongest joint attacks.
The current paper also complements the work of Bennett, Brassard, Cre´peau, and
Maurer [4]: That paper shows that privacy amplification provides security when
the eavesdropper is restricted to perform only individual particle attacks, and the
current paper shows that privacy amplification provides security when the eaves-
dropper is not restricted, and can apply any joint attack on the particles.
Two other security proofs [26,27], and [24,23] were reported just prior to
ours [6]. The security result of Lo and Chau [24] [note that some of the details
were completed or improved in [23]] uses novel techniques and is very important,
but it is somewhat limited: The QKD protocol which is analyzed in [24] requires
that the legitimate users have quantum memories and fault tolerant quantum com-
puters, technologies which are not yet available to the legitimate users, and are not
expected within the next ten or twenty years, while the QKD protocol which is
analyzed here, the BB84 protocol, is now demonstrated with some partial success
in many labs (see many references in Gisin’s reviews [36,20]). Some of the ideas
used in [24] appeared earlier, [e.g., the quantum privacy amplification [16], and the
quantum repeaters [28,29], and the use of fault tolerance quantum error correction
for performing quantum privacy amplification [28,29] but Lo and Chau succeeded
in using them to yield a novel proof of security from classical random sampling
techniques. The security result of Mayers [26,27] is similar to ours in the sense
that it proves the security of a much more realistic protocol against an unrestricted
eavesdropper, and provides explicit bounds on the eavesdropper’s information. It
continues earlier works such as a solution to the error-free case [35].
Our proof is different from Mayers, was derived independently, and may shed
more light on the subject. We analyze the density matrices which are available to
the eavesdropper and we prove that it is extremely rare that these density matrices
carry non-negligible information about the secret key, and at the same time, Alice
and Bob agree to form a secret key. In other words, it is extremely rare that Alice
and Bob agree to form a secret key about which these density matrices reveal non-
negligible information.
1 Many of the leading researchers in experimental quantum cryptography are unfamiliar
with this work of Bennett Mor and Smolin, and still wrongly state that individual particle
attacks could be as strong as collective/joint attacks.
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Two additional proofs were announced more recently [33,1]. Shor and
Preskill’s proof [33] proposes a way to extend Lo and Chau’s proof so that it be-
comes applicable to a more practical protocol, hence bypasses the main limitation
of Lo and Chau’s proof. A written draft of the proof of Ben-Or is expected in the
near future [1].
We base our work on standard assumptions of QKD: 1) We assume the cor-
rectness of quantum theory and its relativistic generalizations, as these were ver-
ified with incredible accuracy in many experiments. 2) Alice and Bob share an
unjammable classical channel. This assumption is usually replaced by the demand
that the classical channel is “unforgeable”; an unforgeable channel can be modified
by an eavesdropper but Alice and Bob will notice that, with probability exponen-
tially close to 1. If Alice and Bob share a much shorter secret key to be used for
authenticating a standard classical channel, they can indeed obtain an unforgeable
channel (hence the protocol is then a quantum key expansion protocol, although
everyone still call it QKD). 3) Eve cannot attack Alice’s and Bob’s laboratories.
She can only attack the quantum channel and listen to all transmissions on the clas-
sical channel. 4) Alice sends quantum bits, i.e. two level systems. This assumption
cannot be fully met in any experimental scenario, but can only be approximated.
We prove, under those assumptions, the security of the BB84 protocol [3],
against any attack allowed by the rules of quantum physics. We prove security for
instances in which the error rate in the transmission from Alice to Bob is up to
7.56%.
Although experimental QKD is very common (see for instance Gisin’s re-
views [36,20]), at the present time no experimental system whatsoever is proven
unconditionally secure. Some security analyses which take into account correc-
tions due to having more than two levels in the quantum systems have been pro-
vided ([12,11]), but research in this area is still in its early stages. In fact, many
experimental systems are totally insecure due to the photon-number-splitting at-
tack [11].
Quantum cryptography [34,3] is described in several publications, some of
which also introduce the notations in a more expository way. Readers unfamiliar
with the basics of quantum information processing are referred to any recently
published textbook on the subject, e.g., [30,21]. Here we focus on QKD [3,2] and
specifically on the BB84 protocol [3].
In BB84 we let
|0〉0 ≡ |0〉;
|1〉0 ≡ |1〉;
|0〉1 ≡ 1√2 (|0〉+ |1〉);
|1〉1 ≡ 1√2 (|0〉 − |1〉),
define four states, such that the first two are orthogonal in one basis (known as
the computation basis, or the “z” basis), and the other two are orthogonal in an-
other basis (the “x” basis). [Using these “spin” notations the bases are |〉0 ≡ |〉z ,
and |〉1 ≡ |〉x.] Note that the two bases are conjugate, namely, applying a mea-
surement in one basis on a state belonging to the other basis gives a fully random
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outcome. In the BB84 protocol Alice and Bob use these four possible quantum
states. Therefore, we shall refer to these states as the BB84 states.
The quantum part of the communication in the BB84 protocol contains one
step — Alice sends Bob a string of qubits, each in one of the four BB84 states
(chosen randomly by Alice). To simplify the analysis, we assume all qubits are
sent to Eve, and then Eve sends all qubits to Bob2.
The rest of the protocol involves sending classical communication via the un-
jammable channel. First Alice sends Bob the basis used for each photon. By com-
paring bases after Alice sends such a state for each qubit and Bob receives the
qubit, a common key can be created in instances when Alice and Bob used the
same basis. Comparing the bases must be performed after Bob receives the qubits,
so that the eavesdropper cannot benefit from having this knowledge while still
holding the qubits. The common key obtained from the above steps is known as
the “sifted key”. A final key is then obtained from the sifted key, after perform-
ing several more steps: testing the error rate on some test bits, chosen at random;
throwing away these test bits, while Alice and Bob can now have some good es-
timation of the error-rate on the remaining shared bits (called information bits);
correcting errors on these information bits, and amplifying the privacy, by creating
a shorter final key.
Alternatively, if Bob has a memory where he can keep his qubits unchanged
after receiving them (we call such a memory “a quantum memory”), a simpler
protocol for obtaining a sifted key is obtained: Bob waits with the received qubits
till he learns the basis, and then measures in the right bases. The sifted key is twice
as big in this case or the initial string of qubits can be shortened to half, if the final
length of the sifted key is to remain the same.
We prove here the security of that simplified protocol in which only the bits
relevant for the sifted key are discussed; we call it the “used-bits-BB84”. We for-
mally describe the used-bits protocol (in detail) in the next section. The proof of
the security of the original BB84 protocol (in which Bob does not have a quantum
memory) easily follows due to a simple reduction, as we show in Appendix A.
In the most general attack on the channel, Eve attacks the qubits in two steps.
First, she lets all qubits pass through a device that weakly probes their state via
a quantum unitary transformation. Then, after receiving all the classical data, she
measures the probe. Eve’s goal is to learn as much information as possible about
the final key without causing Alice and Bob to abort the protocol due to a failure
of the test. We consider here any attack chosen by Eve, described by these two
steps, and we prove security against any such attack. We formally explain Eve’s
most general attack in the next section.
The issue of the security criteria is non-trivial since one obvious security cri-
terion, namely that “Eve’s information given that the test passed, is negligible”,
does not work; this criterion cannot be proven, as a counter example exists3 An-
2 In case Eve can only hold each qubit for a short time and must release it before she gets
the next, she is less powerful, so our proof of security covers that case as well.
3 Namely, there is an attack such that Eve’s information is large even when the test is
passed (although in such cases the test is passed very rarely); Such attacks are studied in
Section 2.3.
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other natural security criterion saying that “either Eve’s average information is
negligible or the probability that the test is passed is negligible”, also does not
work (for a similar reason). The criterion that we shall prove in this work says
that “the event where the test is passed AND Eve’s information is not negligible, is
extremely rare”. This security criterion is formally presented in the next section.
We will moreover show that the final key is reliable: the keys distilled by Alice
and Bob (after error correction and privacy amplification) are identical except for
some exponentially small probability.
Section 2 provides a formal description of the used-bits-BB84 protocol, the
most general attacks, and the security and reliability criteria. The rest of the paper
contains three main steps leading to the desired proof of security: In Section 3 we
reduce the problem of proving security to a simpler problem of optimizing over
all attacks symmetric to the bit values 0 and 1. In Section 4 we analyze the infor-
mation bits in the bases actually used by Alice and Bob, and we prove our main
information versus disturbance theorem for symmetric attacks; the eavesdropper
information about the final key is bounded by the probability of errors induced in
the other bases (namely, errors induced if the other bases were used by Alice and
Bob). We then obtain in Section 5 an exponentially small bound on Eve’s infor-
mation, proving that the security criterion (2.1) described in Section 2 is always
satisfied in QKD, provided a good code for error correction and privacy amplifi-
cation is used. Finally, we analyze a specific code, the random linear code, and we
prove security for instances in which the error rate in the transmission from Alice
to Bob is up to 7.56%. We also analyze the conditions under which this code can
provide data relevant to experimentalists who choose some parameters (such as the
number of photons used for the communication) and would like to obtain bounds
on Eve’s information, on the probability of errors in the final key, and on the result-
ing bit-rate of the protocol. Such explicit bounds are presented here for any error
rate equal to or smaller than 5.50%. We summarize these results in Table 5.1.
We conclude the paper by summarizing the tools used here, and by suggesting
that some of them could be relevant for other proofs as well. Various technical
details and proofs of several lemmas are provided in the appendices.
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2 Notations, the Protocol, Eve’s Attack, the Security Criteria, and the Main
Results
2.1 The used-bits BB84 protocol
Let us describe the used-bits protocol in detail, splitting it into creating the sifted
key and creating the final key from the sifted key. This simplified protocol assumes
that Bob has a quantum memory.
I. Creating the sifted key:
1. Alice and Bob choose a large integer n≫ 1. The protocol uses 2n bits.
2. Alice randomly selects two 2n-bit strings, b and i and sends Bob, via a quantum
communication channel, the string of 2n qubits
|i〉b = |i1〉b1 |i2〉b2 . . . |i2n〉b2n
3. Bob tells Alice when he receives the qubits. [If he received less than 2n qubits
he adds any missing qubit, but in an arbitrary state. If he received more than
2n qubits he ignores any extra qubit. E.g., if qubit number 17 did not arrive
Bob will add it (by choosing its value and basis at random), and if two qubits
arrived instead of one when Bob expects qubit number 17, then Bob will ignore
one of them. Obviously, such cases will contribute to the error rate, ptest.]
4. Alice publishes the bases she used, b; this step should be performed only after
Bob received all the qubits.
Bob measures the qubits in Alice’s bases to obtain a 2n-bit string j.
We shall refer to the resulting 2n-bit string as the sifted key, and it would be
the same for Alice and Bob, i.e. j = i, if natural errors and eavesdropping did
not exist.
II. Creating the final key from the sifted key:
1. Alice chooses at random a 2n-bit string s which has exactly n zeroes and n
ones. There are
(
2n
n
)
such strings to choose from.
2. From the 2n bits, Alice selects a subset of n bits, determined by the zeros in s,
to be the test bits. Alice publishes the string s, along with the values of the test
bits (given by an n-bit string iT ). The values of Bob’s bits on the test bits are
given by jT .
The other n bits are the information bits (given by an n-bit string iI ). They
are used for deriving a final key via error correction codes (ECC) and privacy
amplification (PA) techniques.
Later on, Alice will send the ECC and PA information to Bob, hence Bob needs
to correct his errors using the ECC data, and to obtain a final secret key equal
to Alice’s using the PA data.
3. Bob verifies that the error rate ptest = |iT ⊕ jT |/n in the test bits is lower than
some pre-agreed allowed error-rate pallowed, and aborts the protocol if the error
rate is larger. The maximal possible allowed error-rate is found in Section 5.4.
4. Bob also publishes the values of his test bits (jT ). This is not crucial for the
protocol, but it is done to simplify the proof.
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5. Alice selects an (n, k, d) linear error correcting code C with 2k code words of
n bits and a minimal Hamming distance d between any two words, along with
the ECC parities on the information bits. The strategy is that Alice announces
an r × n parity check matrix PC of C by announcing its r = n − k rows of
n bits v1, . . . , vr. This means that the code contains any i such that i · vq = 0
for any q ∈ {1 . . . r}. Formally speaking, C = {i ∈ {0, 1}n | iP⊤C = 0}, with
P⊤C the transpose of PC . Alice then also announces the r-bit string ξ = iIP⊤C
whose bits are the parities of her (random) information string iI with respect to
the parity check matrix (so the q-th bit ξq of ξ is ξq = iI ·vq for all 1 ≤ q ≤ r).
Bob doesn’t announce anything.
We now explain how the code C is chosen. The condition on C is that it corrects
t ≥ (pallowed + ǫrel)n errors, for some positive (pre-determined) reliability pa-
rameter ǫrel. If an ECC has Hamming weight d ≥ 2t+1 it will always correct t
errors, and thus the condition d ≥ 2(pallowed + ǫrel)n+1 is sufficient. Meaning
that, any code satisfying this criterion is good for Alice and Bob.
For Random Linear Codes a better bound exists, and d ≥ (pallowed + ǫrel)n+1
is also sufficient as noted in [27]; It is not promised that such a code always
corrects t errors, but it is promised that it corrects t errors with probability as
close to 1 as we want (provided we choose a sufficiently large n).
6. Bob performs the correction on his information bits jI as follows: he finds the
n-bit string jBob such that jBobP⊤C = ξ and such that the Hamming distance
between jBob and jI is minimal. As long as there are at most t errors in jI
(i.e. |jI ⊕ iI | ≤ t) the obtained string is unique, and Bob finds the right string,
namely jBob = iI . Note that we are not concerned here with the efficiency of
finding jBob, but a practical protocol ought to be efficient as well.
7. Alice selects a privacy amplification function (PA) and publishes it. The PA
strategy is to publish m strings, of length n each. These privacy-amplification
parity-check strings vr+1, . . . , vr+m shall be used as the rows of an m × n
parity matrix PPA so that the final secret key is a ≡ iIP⊤PA, with at = iI ·
vr+t+1 (for 0 ≤ t ≤ m−1)). This strategy is similar to error correction except
that the m-bit string (namely, the final key) iIP⊤PA is kept secret.
The PA strings must be chosen such that the minimal distance vˆ between any
PA parity string v and any string in the span of their union with the parity-
check-strings of the ECC (the dual to the code) is at least vˆ ≥ 2(pallowed +
ǫsec) n. [This is important for preventing Eve from learning much from the
error-correcting procedure, and furthermore from learning something about the
correlations between the bits of the final key.] Note that, by definition, the min-
imal distance of the space spanned by the ECC and PA strings v1, . . . , vr+m,
which we shall denote d⊥, is less than the distance vˆ; hence if we demand
d⊥ ≥ 2(pallowed + ǫsec) n, the above desired criterion, vˆ ≥ 2(pallowed + ǫsec) n,
is automatically satisfied (due to vˆ ≥ d⊥).
8. Bob calculates a = iIP⊤PA to finally get the key.
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2.2 Eavesdropping
In the most general attack on the channel, Eve attacks the qubits in two steps.
First she lets all qubits pass through a device that weakly probes their state via
a quantum unitary transformation. Then, after receiving all the classical data, she
measures the probe. Note that Eve can gain nothing by measuring the probe ear-
lier, or by measuring the qubits while passing through her. Any such measurement
can also be performed by attaching a probe, applying a unitary transformation, and
measuring the probe (or part of it) at a later stage. Since there is no gain in perform-
ing a measurement before learning all the classical information that is transmitted
throughout the protocol, the optimal attack (WLoG) is to perform all measure-
ments after receiving all classical information. Furthermore, Eve gains nothing by
sending Bob a state that is not a 2n qubit state, so without loss of generality, we
assume she sends exactly 2n photons: If Eve sends less than 2n qubits, Bob will
add the missing qubits in an arbitrary state (see item I-3 in the protocol), so Eve
could have done it herself. If Eve sends more than 2n qubits, Bob ignores the extra
qubits, and again Eve could have done it herself. [An important remark though:
the allowed error rate in these cases must still be limited as described in this work.
However, in real applications the natural losses of qubits become very high due to
transmission across long distances. If one does not wish to limit the distance too
much, and wishes to have security even if losses are much higher than pallowed, then
this is still possible. See a brief explanation in Appendix A.]
It is important to enable an analysis of Eve’s most general attack. Thus we
formally split Eve’s attack into her transformation U and her measurement E .
Eve’s transformation, U : Eve attacks the qubits while they are in the channel
between Alice and Bob. Eve can perform any attack allowed by the laws of
physics, the most general one being any unitary transformation U on Alice’s
qubits and Eve’s probe (an ancilla initially in a state |0〉E).
We are generous to Eve, allowing her to attack all the qubits together (in prac-
tice, she usually needs to release the preceding qubit towards Bob before she
has access to the next one).
Without loss of generality we assume that all the noise on the qubits is caused
by Eve’s transformation.
A remark: In individual-particle attacks and in collective attacks Eve’s transfor-
mation is restricted so that each transmitted qubit is attacked using a separate,
unentangled probe, so that the analysis of U is much simplified. In collective
attacks the next step is as general as it is for the joint attacks (so that Eve can
measure all probes together). In contrast, in individual-particle attacks Eve is
only allowed to measure each probe separately from the others.
Eve’s measurement, E : Eve keeps the probe in a quantum memory, meaning
that she keeps its state unchanged. After Eve receives all the classical infor-
mation from Alice and Bob, including the bases of all bits b, the choice of test
bits s, the test bits values, iT and jT , the ECC, the ECC parities ξ, and the
PA, she tries to guess the final key using her best strategy of measurement.
The measurement can be done by adding a second ancilla, and performing a
standard projection measurement on Eve’s probe and the ancilla. This measure-
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ment is alternatively described (without the need for this second ancilla) by the
so called “generalized measurement” or “POVM”, E , which is a set of positive
operators Ee such that
∑
e Ee = 1. When the measurement is applied onto a
density matrix ρ the outcome e is obtained with probability p(e) = Tr(ρEe).
We fix 4 the set of possible outcomes e, so that it is the same for all the POVMs
used by Eve after she learns iT , jT , b, s and ξ.
For more information about POVMs and their connection to standard projec-
tion measurements in an enlarged Hilbert space, see [31,30].
Eve’s goal is to learn as much information as possible about the final key without
causing Alice and Bob to abort the protocol due to a failure of the test. The task
of finding Eve’s optimal operation in these two steps is very difficult. Luckily, to
prove security that task need not be solved, and it is enough to find bounds on
Eve’s optimal information (via any operation she could have done): In order to
analyze her optimal transformation we find bounds for any transformation U she
could perform, and in order to analyze her optimal measurement we find bounds
for any measurement E she could perform.
2.3 What does security mean?
We consider here any attack chosen by Eve, described by U and E . Let us explain
what we mean by saying that security shall be proven.
As we already mentioned in the introduction, the issue of the security crite-
ria is non-trivial. One obvious security criterion, namely that “Eve’s information
given that the test passed, is negligible”, can be proven wrong (for QKD), and
furthermore, another natural security criterion saying that “either Eve’s average
information is negligible or the probability that the test is passed is negligible”,
also does not work.
The criterion that we shall prove here says that “the event where the test is
passed AND Eve’s information is not negligible, is extremely rare”.
To be more precise we formally present now these security criteria. We first
provide some relevant information-theoretic notations (for some more basic defi-
nitions see Appendix B.1). LetA be the random variable whose values are Alice’s
final key, a = iIP⊤PA, and E be a random variable whose values e are the outputs
of Eve’s measurement E . Note that e are outcomes of a measurement that itself is
a function of all the classical data provided to Eve, the ECC and PA (that can be
given to Eve in advance), and also iT , jT , b, s, and ξ. However, we usually consider
any attack, therefore for any fixed parameters of the attack, {U, E}, the resulting e
are regular classical values of a regular classical random variable E , so all standard
rules of classical information theory (as described in Appendix B.1) apply to them.
Note that our proof never needs to assume that the ECC data P⊤C and the PA data
P⊤PA are random, or even that these are initially unknown to Eve. Therefore these
can be chosen in advance and be considered as fixed parameters of the protocol.
4 This fixing is allowed due to Davies’ theorem [15].
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LetT be the random variable presenting whether the test passed or failed (T is
“pass” if |iT ⊕ jT | ≤ npa and is “fail” otherwise, with pa denoting the allowed er-
ror rate pa ≡ pallowed). Let cT = iT ⊕ jT and cI = iI ⊕ jI be the error syndromes
on the test and the information bits. Let I(A;E) be the mutual information be-
tween Alice’s final key and the results of Eve’s measurement. Since some classical
data is given to Eve, let IEve ≡ I(A;E | iT , jT , b, s, ξ) be the information Eve
has about the key given a particular PA, ECC (that remain fixed parameters), iT ,
jT , b, s and ξ (the parity string on the information bits, ξ = iIP⊤C ). This informa-
tion might be large for some specific values (for instance, if b is fixed, and Eve has
accidently guessed all the bases correctly), but on average it ought to be negligible
in order for the key to be secret. The average information obtained by Eve if a key
was always created by Alice is 〈IEve〉 ≡ I(A;E | IT ,JT ,B,S,Ξ), where IT ,
JT ,B, S and Ξ are the random variables associated to the random outputs iT , jT ,
b, s and ξ = iIP⊤C . This information cannot be proven to be small, because the
fact that the test must be passed is not taken into consideration.
We can now formally present our security criteria. In order to get a better intu-
ition of what security really means, we also formally present in Appendix B.2 the
two security criteria mentioned above, criteria that are not met by the QKD pro-
tocol. We even prove via counter examples, the SWAP attack and the half-SWAP
attack, that these security criteria indeed don’t work5. The SWAP and the half-
SWAP examples motivate a more precise definition of security (first used in [27])
that does work properly, and shall be used in the current work.
2.3.1 The security criterion: We show in this paper that the event where the test
is passed and Eve obtains meaningful information about the key is extremely un-
likely. This is proven here for any attack {U, E}. Formally, our security criterion
is:
P
[
(T = pass) ∧ (IEve ≥ Ainfo e−βinfon)
] ≤ Aluck e−βluckn , (2.1)
with Ainfo, βinfo, Aluck and βluck positive constants. Note that this is a criterion for
exponential security, and a less strict criterion can be defined if one is willing to
accept polynomial security (say, with a huge polynomial such as n1000). However,
exponential criteria are preferable when possible, and we succeed to prove here an
exponential security criterion.
2.3.2 An alternative security criterion: Let us define I′Eve to be equal
to IEve when T = pass and to be equal to 0 otherwise. Then, the
event
[
(T = pass) ∧ (IEve ≥ Ainfo e−βinfon)
]
is identical to the event [I′Eve ≥
Ainfoe
−βinfon]. The security criterion can now be written more concisely as
P [I′Eve ≥ Ainfoe−βinfon] ≤ Alucke−βluckn .
5 If Eve is applying the SWAP attack, her information given that the test is passed will
not be small, and the first criterion is not satisfied; If Eve is applying the Half-SWAP attack,
she gets a lot of information (half the bits on average), and yet passes the test with high
probability, so the second criterion is not satisfied. In contrast, the criteria we use in this
paper are satisfied by any attack whatsoever.
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The expectancy of I′Eve which is
〈I′Eve〉 =
∑
iT ,jT ,b,s,ξ
I
′
Eve(iT , jT , b, s, ξ)p(iT , jT , b, s, ξ) ,
can now be used to define an important security condition:
〈I′Eve〉 ≤ Ae−βn , (2.2)
with A and β positive constants. As the following lemma shows, the security cri-
terion, Eq. (2.1) is implied by this security condition.
Lemma 2.1 If 〈I′Eve〉 ≤ Ae−βn for A > 0 then
P [I′Eve ≥ Ainfoe−βinfon] ≤ Alucke−βluckn
for all Ainfo, Aluck, βinfo, βluck such that AinfoAluck = A, βinfo + βluck = β and
Aluck > 0.
[Note that the security criterion 2.1 is therefore implied since the event[
(T = pass) ∧ (IEve ≥ Ainfo e−βinfon)
]
is identical to the event [I′Eve ≥
Ainfoe
−βinfon].]
Proof I′Eve is never negative. Therefore, by Markov’s inequality [10] (that is
P [X ≥ α] ≤ 〈X〉/α for any non-negative random variable X),
P [I′Eve ≥ Ainfoe−βinfon] ≤
〈I′Eve〉
Ainfoe−βinfon
≤ Ae
−βn
Ainfoe−βinfon
= Alucke
−βluckn ⊓⊔
We gain two things by using this alternative security criteria. The first is some
additional intuition about the security parameter, and the second is a final form of
the criterion which is the one we actually prove here in the paper.
By definition, 〈I′Eve〉 =
∑
iT ,jT ,b,s,ξ
I
′
Eve(iT , jT , b, s, ξ)p(iT , jT , b, s, ξ) is
equal to
∑
iT ,jT :|iT⊕jT |≤npa
∑
b,s,ξ I(A;E | iT , jT , b, s, ξ)p(iT , jT , b, s, ξ),
thus, it is easy to calculate that
〈I′Eve〉 = I(A;E | IT ,JT ,B,S,Ξ,T = pass)P [T = pass] , (2.3)
(see Appendix B.3.1 for the details of this calculation). This expression provides
some intuition regarding the security criterion, Eq.(2.2): It says that if either the
probability to pass the test is negligible or Eve’s information given that the test is
passed is negligible, then security is promised.
Using cT (the error syndrome on the test bits) and using the random variable
CT ≡ IT ⊕ JT (the random variable corresponding to the error syndrome), we
can also write
〈I′Eve〉 =
∑
cT |T=pass
P [CT = cT ] I(A;E|IT ,CT = cT ,B,S,Ξ) (2.4)
(see Appendix B.3.1 for the details of this calculation as well). This is true since
the random variable C is equivalent to the random variable J when the random
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variable I is given, and since summing over all the events {cT |T = pass} provides
exactly the event {T = pass}.
This last expression, Eq.(2.4), tells us that the security criterion (2.2) is satisfied
if: ∑
cT |T=pass
P [CT = cT ] I(A;E|IT ,CT = cT ,B,S,Ξ) ≤ Ae−βn . (2.5)
Thus, this last equation is yet another form of the security criteria. Indeed, in Lem-
mas 5.3 and 5.4 in Section 5 we obtain an exponentially small bound on 〈I′Eve〉.
This inequality then implies that the security criterion (2.1) is satisfied, for all
attacks without any restriction whatsoever, therefore proving the security of the
used-bits-BB84 and the original BB84 protocols.
To improve the intuition about the different security criteria (those that work
for QKD and also those that do not work) we prove in Appendix B.3.2 that the
Half-SWAP attack can easily be dealt with, once we use our security criteria;
meaning that the security criteria are still satisfied.
2.4 The main result: a security proof
In this paper we provide a proof of the security of the used-bits BB84 protocol
against any attack on the channel.
Formally we prove the following:
If the allowed error-rate pa, some positive number ǫsec, and the ECC+PA codes
are chosen such that pa + ǫsec ≤ vˆ/2n with vˆ = minr+mr′=r+1 dH(vr′ , V excr′ )
where dH is the Hamming distance, vr′ a parity-check string, and V excr′ the
2r+m−1 space which is the span of the ECC and PA excluding vr′ (namely,
the span of v1, . . . , vr′−1, vr′+1, . . . , vr+m), then for any Ainfo > 0, Aluck > 0
such that AinfoAluck = 2m and any βinfo and βluck such that βinfo + βluck =
ǫ2sec/4,
P
[
(T = pass) ∧ (IEve ≥ Ainfo e−βinfon)
] ≤ Aluck e−βluckn (2.6)
whereT = pass iff |cT | ≤ npa and IEve = I(A;E | iT , jT , b, s, ξ).
2.5 Reliability
It will moreover be shown here that if the ECC corrects Pa + ǫrel errors then the
final m-bit key is reliable: The keys distilled by Alice and Bob are identical except
for some exponentially small probability Arel e−βreln, with Arel = 1 and βrel =
ǫ2rel/2.
We shall eventually present here an example of a family of ECC+PA codes
such that the final key is secure and reliable, as long as the error rate pa is less than
7.56%, and such that the bit-rate approaches one when the error-rate approaches
zero. Furthermore, we present a different range of these codes such that for large
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enough6 but reasonable n the final key is secure and reliable, as long as the allowed
error rate pa is less than 5.50%; in Table 5.1 we provide some specific numbers
that might be interesting to experimentalists who design a QKD protocol.
6 Namely, not asymptotically large. For instance, n of the order of 104 or 105.
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3 Eve’s Attack
In the used-bits BB84 protocol Alice encodes a string i in the bases of her choice
b in the state |i〉b which she sends to Bob via a quantum channel; Bob measures a
string j using the same set of bases. In order to perform her attack, Eve prepares
a probe, E, in a known (ancillary) state, which W.L.G. can be written as a vector
|0〉E and performs a unitary transformation U on the state
|0〉E|i〉b
where |i〉b is assumed to have been intercepted by Eve. The resulting state
U |0〉E|i〉b can be expressed in a unique way as a sum
U |0〉E|i〉b =
∑
j
|E′i,j〉b|j〉b (3.1)
where the vectors |E′i,j〉b are non normalized vectors in Eve’s probe space.
|E′i,j〉b = b〈j|U |0〉E|i〉b (3.2)
Eve then sends the disturbed qubits to Bob, keeping her probe in her hands. We
call the state above
|ψ′i〉 ≡
∑
j
|E′i,j〉b|j〉b (3.3)
“Eve-Bob’s state”, because it is the state in the hands of Eve and Bob together.
Of course, Eve does not know the basis b when she performs her attack U with
initial probe |0〉E. Actually, Eve-Bob’s state is not known to any of the players:
Alice knows i and b, Eve knowsU (namely, the set of states |E′i,j〉b) but she knows
neither i, nor j nor b, while Bob knows nothing prior to obtaining b from Alice
(except his knowledge of the protocol). In the next steps Alice sends b to Bob (and
Eve), and Bob measures and obtains his sifted key j. Then Alice sends s to Bob
(and Eve) and both Alice and Bob disclose the test bits iT and jT . The information
bits are still kept secret.
This section deals with two issues. 1.— symmetrizing Eve’s attack; 2.— the
attack on all bits versus the attack induced on the information bits.
Subsection 3.1 presents the symmetrized attack. Subsection 3.2 presents im-
portant properties of the symmetric attack. Subsection 3.3 proves that symmetric
attacks are at least as good for Eve as any other attack can be. Subsection 3.4
distills the attack on the information bits, and finally, Subsection 3.5 analyzes the
symmetrized attacks, when test bits and information bits are treated separately.
3.1 Symmetrizing Eve’s attack
For any attack {U, E}, we shall now define a different attack {U sym, E sym}, which
can be at least as good (for Eve) as the attack {U, E}, it is symmetric to bit flips,
and it is simpler to analyze. The symmetric attack {U sym, E sym} is obtained by
enlarging Eve’s probe, adding a second probe, M, containing 2n qubits in a state
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(1/2n)
∑
m |m〉M, and transforming it and measuring it as described below. The
attack is “symmetric” in a sense that it is unaffected by the choice of i by Alice,
and this is true for any basis b.
The symmetrization is done here in a physical way, namely, as a process that
Eve can actually do if she wants to7. The symmetrization process can be done
in a way that is always beneficial for Eve, and therefore, any attack, no matter
how good it is, is no better than its optimal symmetrization. Thus, W.L.G., it is
sufficient to prove security against all symmetric attack. In order to intuitively
understand the design of these symmetric attacks (starting from any attack), we
note that for the original attack, applying the attack (U ) to a state i ⊕ m gives
U |0〉E|i⊕m〉b =
∑
j′ |E′i⊕m,j′〉b|j′〉b =
∑
j |E′i⊕m,j⊕m〉b|j ⊕m〉b with j =
j′ ⊕m. The symmetrization is achieved by Eve in practice in several steps.
We first present the symmetrization as if Eve knows the bases b: When
the additional ancilla state is |m〉M she applies her original attack after “shift-
ing” i by m (namely XORing i with m, via bitwise Controlled-NOT gates):
U |0〉E|i⊕m〉b|m〉M =
∑
j |E′i⊕m,j⊕m〉b|j ⊕m〉b|m〉M. Now we can see that
averaging the original attack over i is equivalent to averaging the shifted at-
tack over all values m. The averaging over m is easily obtained due to start-
ing with a quantum state which is an equal superposition of all values of m,
|0x〉M ≡ (1/2n)
∑
m |m〉M. Then Eve could always measure m and continue with
the same POVMs (where each POVM is a function of the values of iT , b, . . .) as in
the original attack obtaining her original asymmetric attack up to a shift of all val-
ues by XORing them with m. Let us refer to this attack as the “trivial symmetric
attack” {U sym, Etrivial}. We can also define a slightly stronger and more general
attack in which Eve measures m on her additional probe, but continues with any
POVM she finds appropriate. We call this attack the “simple symmetrized attack”.
Obviously, for a given U (and its modified attack, U sym), the optimal simple sym-
metrical attack is better than the trivial symmetric attack, because potentially more
informative POVMs are chosen. The most general symmetric attack {U sym, E sym}
generalizes this simple symmetric attack, as Eve can choose any measurement
(rather than measuring m first). Clearly, the optimal symmetric attack (for a given
U ) is therefore at least as informative as the trivial and the simple symmetric at-
tacks.
Note that in the trivial symmetric attack, when Eve’s second probe is measured
yielding an outcome m, we get back the original attack, up to a shift by m. If
the error rate in the original attack U is averaged over all i and the error rate
in the new attack is averaged over all m, the resulting average error rate is the
same. Thus, the trivial symmetric attack induces the same error-rate, and gives
Eve the same information as the original attack. However, as we just explained,
in the symmetrized attack {U sym, E sym} Eve can also use the state |m〉 in other
ways than just measuring m. This modification cannot change the error-rate due
to causality (Eve’s measurement can be done after Alice and Bob completed their
protocol). On the other hand, the optimal symmetrization (optimal POVM, E sym,
7 One can also view the symmetrization as a virtual process. This makes some differ-
ences, but we do not consider this case here.
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for each value of iT , b, . . .) will be at least as good as the trivial one, meaning
that for any value of iT , b, . . ., it would not decrease Eve’s information, while
it could increase it. As a result of these two intuitive observations dealing with
symmetrized attacks is sufficient, and any other attack cannot be better for Eve.
We render these observations formally sound later on in Subsection 3.3, but we
first must deal with the general case in which the basis b is not known to Eve by
the time she performs the symmetrization.
The fact that Alice’s state is also defined by a basis b which is unknown to Eve
makes the required symmetrization slightly more complex, because we would like
to obtain i⊕m no matter what the basis is. This is done as follows: We define the
new attack in terms of a previously fixed basis; we will choose the computational
basis, i.e. the basis {|i〉0} (for b = 0, the zero string). For each qubit sent by Alice,
Eve attaches a new ancillary bit; her new ancilla (Eve’s second probe, M) is thus
a 2n qubit register, whose basis states are called |m〉M. She then applies indepen-
dently to each pair of qubits (Alice’s qubit plus the attached qubit from the probe
M) the unitary transform satisfying the equalities S|0〉0|0〉 = |0〉0|0〉, S|1〉0|0〉 =
|1〉0|0〉, S|0〉0|1〉 = |1〉0|1〉 and S|1〉0|1〉 = −|0〉0|1〉 (if the computational basis
is |0z〉, |1z〉 then this corresponds to performing a controlled σxσz transforma-
tion on each of Alice’s qubits using the corresponding ancillary bit as control bit).
If we evaluate S on basis vectors of the alternate basis |0〉1 ≡ 1√2 (|0〉 + |1〉) and
|1〉1 ≡ 1√2 (|0〉−|1〉), we get immediately S|0〉1|0〉 = |0〉1|0〉, S|1〉1|0〉 = |1〉1|0〉,
S|0〉1|1〉 = −|1〉1|1〉 and S|1〉1|1〉 = |0〉1|1〉; as a consequence, for each such pair
of qubits, we can summarize the effect of S on basis states by the equality (where
i, m and b are 0 or 1)
S|i〉b|m〉 = (−1)(i⊕b)m|i⊕m〉b|m〉 .
On 2n such pairs of qubits, the exponents simply add up and, for any string i, m
and b of 2n bits we get
SAM |i〉b|m〉M = (−1)(i⊕b)·m|i⊕m〉b|m〉M (3.4)
S†AM |i〉b|m〉M = (−1)(i⊕b⊕m)·m|i⊕m〉b|m〉M (3.5)
where the subscript for S means it acts on Alice’s qubits (A) and the second probe
(M), where the second equation is deduced from the first by using the fact that
S†S = 1, and with S being a 24n × 24n matrix.
The symmetrized attack is therefore defined by the initial state of the additional
probe |0x〉M ≡ (1/2n)
∑
m |m〉M, and by the unitary transform
U sym ≡ (1E ⊗ S†AM )(UEA ⊗ 1M)(1E ⊗ SAM ) (3.6)
where UEA is Eve’s original attack on Alice’s qubits (A) and Eve’s first probe
(E), S is applied onto Alice’s qubits and Eve’s second probe, and 1E and 1M are
the identity on Eve’s first and second probe space respectively. This completes the
definition of the symmetrized attack.
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3.2 Some basic properties of symmetric attacks
3.2.1 The “Basic Lemma of Symmetrization”: For any attack U , and for any
basis b, we write U sym slightly differently now by defining |Esym ′i,j 〉b via
U sym|0〉Eve|i〉b = U sym|0〉E|0x〉M|i〉b ≡
∑
j
|Esym ′i,j 〉b|j〉b
where both probes |0〉E and |0x〉M have been put together (adjacent to each other)
on the left side, to clarify the definition of these |Esym ′i,j 〉b.
Given any attack U , with its |E′i,j〉b the symmetrization leads to these Esym ′i,j s
that can now be described via the original E′i,js as follows:
Lemma 3.1 For any basis string b
|Esym ′i,j 〉b = 2−n
∑
m
(−1)(i⊕j)·m|E′i⊕m,j⊕m〉b|m〉 (3.7)
We refer to this Lemma as the Basic Lemma of Symmetrization.
Proof In order to calculate smoothly, we write (again) |0〉E|i〉b|0x〉M (instead of
|0〉E|0x〉M|i〉b) in the order the Hilbert spaces appear in equation (3.6) defining
U sym:
U sym|0〉E|i〉b|0〉M =
2−n(1E ⊗ S)†(U ⊗ 1M)(1E ⊗ S)
[∑
m
|0〉E|i〉b|m〉
]
= 2−n(1E ⊗ S)†(U ⊗ 1M)
[∑
m
(−1)(i⊕b)·m|0〉E|i⊕m〉b|m〉
]
= 2−n(1E ⊗ S)†

∑
m,j
(−1)(i⊕b)·m|E′i⊕m,j⊕m〉b|j ⊕m〉b|m〉


= 2−n
∑
m,j
(−1)(i⊕b)·m(−1)(j⊕m⊕b⊕m)·m|E′i⊕m,j⊕m〉b|j〉b|m〉
= 2−n
∑
j
∑
m
(−1)(i⊕j)·m|E′i⊕m,j⊕m〉b|j〉b|m〉
which proves the lemma. ⊓⊔
The Lemma tells us (intuitively) that Eve gets a similar replacement of E′i,j by
E′i⊕m,j⊕m whether she symmetrizes with respect to the computational basis or
with respect to any other basis. This means that symmetrization with respect to the
output bits 0 or 1 results also in some form of symmetry with respect to the bases.
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3.2.2 Symmetrization and the error-rate: For any attack (symmetric or not) the
probability that Bob measures the string j in basis b if Alice sent i is given
by p(j | i, b) = 〈E′i,j |E′i,j〉b. In particular, for symmetric attacks psym(j |
i, b) = 〈Esym ′i,j |Esym ′i,j 〉b. As a consequence of the Basic Lemma of Symmetriza-
tion (Lemma 3.1) we can now establish a link between psym(j | i, b), the probabil-
ity that (under the symmetrized attack) Bob measures j in basis b if Alice sent i,
with p(j | i, b), the corresponding probability for the original attack. For a given
b and i, the probability of some specific j = i ⊕ c becomes the probability of c.
Thus we can also conclude a link between psym(c | i, b) and p(c | i, b). The two
main conclusions of the forthcomming lemma are that (a) — the probability (in
the symmetrized attack) psym(c | i, b) for a given i, is actually independent of i,
as it is equal to p(c | b), and (b) — the probability (in the symmetrized attack)
psym(c | b) is equal to the probability in the original attack, as it is equal to p(c | b).
Lemma 3.2 For any i chosen by Alice and for any j = i⊕ c
psym(j | i, b) ≡ psym(i⊕ c | i, b) = 2−2n
∑
i′
p(i′ ⊕ c | i′, b) ,
(3.8)
psym(c | i, b) = psym(i⊕ c | i, b) = psym(j | i, b) = p(c | b) , (3.9)
psym(c | b) = p(c | b) (3.10)
Proof Using the fact that the states |m〉 are orthonormal, we get
psym(j | i, b) = 〈Esym ′i,j |Esym ′i,j 〉b
= 2−2n
∑
m
〈E′i⊕m,j⊕m|E′i⊕m,j⊕m〉b by Eq. (3.7)
= 2−2n
∑
m
p(j ⊕m | i⊕m, b) ,
By assigning i′ = i ⊕m this gives psym(j | i, b) = 2−2n∑i′ p(j ⊕ i′ ⊕ i | i′, b).
With c = i ⊕ j we finally get psym(i ⊕ c | i, b) = 2−2n∑i′ p(i′ ⊕ c | i′, b). This
completes the first part of the Lemma.
By definition, the averaging over all i′ means that 2−2n
∑
i′ p(i
′ ⊕ c | i′, b) ≡
p(c | b), so we get psym(i ⊕ c | i, b) = p(c | b). We conclude that psym(i ⊕ c | i, b)
is actually independent of i, namely, psym(j | i, b) = p(c | b). For a given b and i,
psym(j | i, b) = psym(i ⊕ c | i, b) = psym(c | i, b). This completes the proof of the
second part of the lemma.
We now start with psym(i⊕c | i, b) = p(c | b). Then, averaging psym(i⊕c | i, b)
over all i means that 2−2n
∑
i p
sym(i ⊕ c | i, b) ≡ psym(c | b). However, the
summation is over equal terms [p(c | b)], so we finally get psym(c | b) = psym(i⊕c |
i, b), proving the last part of the Lemma. ⊓⊔
3.3 Symmetric attacks are optimal for the eavesdropper
We now show that for any attack {U, E}, the attack {U sym, Etrivial} leaves the same
average error rate and also provides the same information to Eve as the original
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attack. The optimal symmetric attack (for a given U ), in which the optimization
is over all the possible measurements E sym leaves the same average error rate and
provides information to Eve that is equal or larger than that of the original attack
U . These results imply (see Lemma 5.2) that if the security criterion is satisfied
for all symmetric attacks, then it is satisfied for all attacks. Let us recall that due
to causality Bob’s outcome will be the same whatever measurement Eve performs.
Since symmetrization in one basis yields symmetrization at any basis, we may
assume (W.L.G.) that Eve performed her symmetrization with respect to the basis
used by Alice and Bob. In that context, if Eve uses the trivial symmetrized attack,
and measures |m〉 in the standard basis, this is simply a replacement of i by i⊕m
and j by j ⊕m with respect to the original attack. Continuing by a POVM as in
the original attack, now yields the same information as the original attack, while
clearly Eve could do better, as earlier explained.
In the following subsections we make the above intuition mathematically solid.
[Recall that the string s (where a position equal to 1 corresponds to an information
bit in i whilst a 0 indicates a test bit) determines two substrings of i, namely iI
(information bits) and iT (test bits); after s is published by Alice we may identify
|i〉b with |iT 〉b|iI〉b = |iT 〉b ⊗ |iI〉b (this isomorphism depends on s, and is just a
permutation of bits); note that the same modification applies to |j〉b.]
3.3.1 Symmetrization does not affect the average error-rate: As a corollary of
Lemma 3.2, when s is known, we get
Corollary 3.1
P sym[cI , cT | b, s] = P [cI , cT | b, s] (3.11)
P sym[cT | b, s] = P [cT | b, s] . (3.12)
The first equation is a slight modification of the third part of Lemma 3.2 (due to s
being published), and the second equation is obtained from the first by summing
over all cI .
These results prove that the average error-rate is not changed when an attack
U is replaced by any symmetric attack U sym.
3.3.2 Eve’s information is not decreased by symmetrization: Let Esym be the
random variable whose values e are the output of Eve’s measurement E sym, and
note that the measurement is fixed at the end of the protocol, hence depends on
the value of {iT , cT , b, s, ξ}. For any particular attack U and particular value
{iT , cT , b, s, ξ}, the maximal value of I(A;Esym | iT ,CT = cT , b, s, ξ) corre-
sponding to Eve’s symmetrized attack and optimal measurement is larger than or
equal to that obtained if she restricts herself to performing the trivial symmetric
attack (namely, to measuring the |m〉 probe in the standard basis, and repeat the
POVM of the original attack).
Let us denote (E′,M) the (multivariate) random variable where for each par-
ticular value of m,E′ are the random outputs of the trivial symmetric attack. Then,
we have by the very definition of the optimal measurement that
max
{E sym}
I(A;Esym | iT ,CT = cT , b, s, ξ) ≥ I(A;E′,M | iT ,CT = cT , b, s, ξ) ,
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where {E sym} does not stand for one POVM but for a set of POVMs, one for each
value of iT , cT , b, s, ξ. We would like to bound
I(A;E | IT ,CT = cT , b, s,Ξ) =
∑
iT ,ξ
P [iT , ξ | cT , b, s]I(A;E | iT ,CT = cT , b, s, ξ) .
We must note the important fact that the POVM is only fixed at the end of the
protocol, hence a different POVM E is chosen for each fixed value of iT , ξ (as
the other parameters are fixed here). The same is true for the trivial symmetrized
attack
I(A;E′,M | IT ,CT = cT , b, s,Ξ)
=
∑
iT ,ξ
P [iT , ξ | cT , b, s]I(A;E′,M | iT ,CT = cT , b, s, ξ) ,
and the same is true for the optimal symmetrized attack (for a given U )
max I(A;Esym | IT ,CT = cT , b, s,Ξ)
≡
∑
iT ,ξ
P [iT , ξ | cT , b, s] max{E sym} I(A;E
sym | iT ,CT = cT , b, s, ξ) . (3.13)
With that definition we are promised that symmetrization is optimal for each par-
ticular value of {iT , cT , b, s, ξ} and the resulting information is optimal also after
summing over iT , ξ:
max I(A;Esym | IT ,CT = cT , b, s,Ξ) ≥ I(A;E′,M | IT ,CT = cT , b, s,Ξ)
Now we are ready to present the main result of this subsection. An optimal
symmetrization of U will not decrease the information accessible to Eve in the
following sense:
Lemma 3.3 For any fixed U, cT , b, s,
max I(A;Esym | IT ,CT = cT , b, s,Ξ) ≥ I(A;E | IT ,CT = cT , b, s,Ξ)
(3.14)
Proof For any given U , the optimal symmetric attack is at least as good as the
trivial symmetric attack for each value of cT , b, s, iT , ξ, and therefore also after
summing over iT , ξ.
Proving formally that the trivial symmetric attack is as good as the original
attack is less trivial8. Actually, for simplicity, we only prove the relevant direction,
namely, that the trivial symmetric attack is at least as good as the original attack:
I(A;E′,M | IT ,CT = cT , b, s,Ξ) ≥ I(A;E | IT ,CT = cT , b, s,Ξ) (3.15)
For the details of that proof, see Appendix C.1. ⊓⊔
The above result means that we can use a bound on Eve’s average information
in the case of a symmetrized attack to apply to the unsymmetrized case.
8 Still, it is somewhat similar to the argument given when we analyzed the case in which
Eve knows the bases.
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3.4 Eve-Bob’s state after the basis and the test bits are known
When the strings b and s are given to Bob (and to Eve) then Eve-Bob’s state
(Eq.3.3) ought to be modified. The sifted keys |i〉b and |j〉b, the resulting error
syndrome c = i ⊕ j, Eve’s attack U , and Eve’s unnormalized states E′i,j are now
expressed differently, so that the test bits and information bits are written sepa-
rately. Equation (3.1) can thus be rewritten as
U |0〉E|iT 〉b|iI〉b =
∑
j
|E′iT ,iI ,jT ,jI 〉b|jT 〉b|jI〉b (3.16)
where the right-hand side corresponds to Eve-Bob’s state (|ψ′i〉) for a given i =
iT iI , and where
|E′iT ,iI ,jT ,jI 〉b = b〈jT |b〈jI |U |0〉E|iT 〉b|iI〉b . (3.17)
The probability that Bob measures |jT 〉b|jI〉b is
p(jT , jI |iT , iI , b, s) = 〈E′iT ,iI ,jT ,jI |E′iT ,iI ,jT ,jI 〉b . (3.18)
Once iT is also given to Eve and Bob, it is considered as a fixed parameter
instead of a variable in the equation above. When jT is measured, the right-hand
states
∑
j |E′iT ,iI ,jT ,jI 〉b|jT 〉b|jI〉b are projected onto the particular jT obtained
by the measurement on the test bits, and 2n basis states are left in the summation,
corresponding to the 2n possible values of the n information qubits in Bob’s hands.
Formally, the projection is described via 〈jT |ψ′i〉 =
∑
jI
|E′iT ,iI ,jT ,jI 〉b|jI〉b. The
projection should now be followed by a normalization of the state, thus modifying
Eve-Bob’s state to become
|ψiI 〉 =
∑
jI
1√
p(jT |iT , iI , b, s)
|E′iT ,iI ,jT ,jI 〉b|jI〉b . (3.19)
With p(jT |iT , iI , b, s) =
∑
jI
p(jT , jI |iT , iI , b, s) and using Eq.(3.18) we get that
the normalization factor (due to the projection on jT ) is the square root of
p(jT |iT , iI , b, s) =
∑
jI
〈E′iT ,iI ,jT ,jI |E′iT ,iI ,jT ,jI 〉b . (3.20)
Let us now define9
|EiI ,jI 〉b,s ≡
1√
p(jT |iT , iI , b, s)
|E′iT ,iI ,jT ,jI 〉b , (3.21)
so that the resulting Eve-Bob’s state can be written more economically in the form
|ψiI 〉 =
∑
jI
|EiI ,jI 〉b,s|jI〉b . (3.22)
9 The expression |EiI ,jI 〉b,s is also a function of the parameters iT and jT (which are
known to Eve by now), but, writing the expression as |EiI ,jI 〉b,s,iT ,jT looks cumbersome;
therefore, for convenience, we did not write them in the expression, while we keep b, s to
remind us that the bases and the test are known.
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From Eqs. (3.18, 3.21) and the conditional probability formula [p(ab)/p(a) =
p(b|a)] we get
〈EiI ,jI |EiI ,jI 〉b,s = p(jI | iI , iT , jT , b, s) ; (3.23)
with c = i ⊕ j this gives 〈EiI ,iI⊕cI |EiI ,iI⊕cI 〉b,s = p(iI ⊕ cI | iI , iT , jT , b, s) =
p(cI | iI , iT , jT , b, s).
3.5 Symmetrization — its impact on the test and information bits:
We first prove that for symmetrized attacks various expressions become indepen-
dent of iI :
Lemma 3.4
psym(jT | iT , iI , b, s) = psym(jT | iT , b, s) . (3.24)
Proof As an immediate corollary of Lemma 3.2 (that says that psym(c | i, b) =
p(c | b)) when s is known, we get
psym(cT , cI | iT , iI , b, s) = p[cT , cI | b, s] .
Recalling that cT = iT ⊕ jT and cI = iI ⊕ jI , this implies that for any m′I
psym(jT , jI ⊕m′I | iT , iI ⊕m′I , b, s) = psym(jT , jI | iT , iI , b, s) .
If we sum both sides of this equality over jI we get psym(jT | iT , iI ⊕mI , b, s) =
psym(jT | iT , iI , b, s) which means that the probability is independent of iI ,
psym(jT | iT , iI , b, s) = psym(jT | iT , b, s) .
⊓⊔
As a corollary of the above Lemma, notice that for symmetric attacks,
Corollary 3.2
psym(iI |iT , jT , b, s) = 1/2n. (3.25)
Indeed, using the Bayes rule (on {jT ; iI})
psym(iI | iT , jT , b, s) = p
sym(jT | iI , iT , b, s)
psym(jT | iT , b, s) p
sym(iI | iT , b, s) = 1
2n
where the last equality results from Eq. (3.24) and the fact that all bits of i, b and
s are chosen independently [so psym(iI | iT , b, s) = 12n ].
Another important consequence of Lemma 3.4 is:
Lemma 3.5 For the information bits:
1. 〈EsymiI ,iI⊕cI |E
sym
iI⊕kI ,iI⊕cI⊕kI 〉b,s is independent of iI .
2.
∑
j〈EsymiI ,jI |E
sym
iI⊕kI ,jI⊕kI 〉b,s is independent of iI .
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The proof is given in Appendix C.2.
The next step is to show that for symmetrized attacks various expressions are
independent also of bI . We proved in Lemma 3.4 that the normalizing factor for
fixed iT , jT , b and s is the same for all the indices iI . In addition, that normalizing
factor does not depend on bI either:
Lemma 3.6
psym(jT | iT , b, s) ≡ psym(jT | iT , bI , bT , s) = psym(jT | iT , bT , s) . (3.26)
Proof In fact, Eq.(3.26) is true for any attack (symmetrized or not):
p(jT | iT , b, s) ≡ p(jT | iT , bI , bT , s) = p(jT | iT , bT , s) . (3.27)
Intuitively, the fact that iI is not a given parameter actually means that we average
over it (as p(a) = ∑b p(a, b) = ∑b p(b)p(a|b)). Once we average over it, the
relevant quantum bits are traced out, causing independence of bI as well. Thus, in
general, j of one subset (such as jT ) is independent of b of another subset (such as
bI ). This is formally proven in Appendix C.3. Thus follows psym(jT | iT , b, s) =
psym(jT | iT , bT , s). ⊓⊔
As a trivial Corollary of Lemmas 3.4 and 3.6 we get the following:
Corollary 3.3 For symmetrized attacks, the probability of jT satisfies
psym(jT | iT , iI , b, s) = psym(jT | iT , bT , s) , (3.28)
and therefore, Eq.(3.21) is simplified to
|EsymiI ,jI 〉b,s =
1√
psym(jT |iT , bT , s)
|Esym ′iT ,iI ,jT ,jI 〉b . (3.29)
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4 Information vs. Disturbance
In this section we analyze the information bits alone (for a given symmetric attack
U sym, a given input iT and outcome jT on the test bits, and given bases b and choice
of test bits s). When no ambiguity arises, the indices b and s will be dropped; |i〉
will denote |i〉b, |iI〉 will denote |iI〉bI and |EsymiI ,jI 〉b,s will be denoted |EiI ,jI 〉.
Our result here applies for any U sym, hence in particular for the optimal one. The
optimization over Eve’s measurement is avoided by using the fact that trace norm
of the difference of two density matrices provides an upper bound on the accessible
information one could obtain via any measurement when having the two density
matrices as the possible inputs.
4.1 Eve’s state
When Alice sends a state |iI〉 ≡ |iI〉bI for the information bits (where bI is the
string actually used by her and Bob to fix the bases on information bits), the state
of Eve and Bob together, |ψiI 〉 =
∑
jI
|EiI ,jI 〉|jI〉 is fully determined by Eve’s
attack and by the data regarding the test bits. Eve’s state in that case is fully deter-
mined by tracing-out Bob’s subsystem |jI〉 from Eve-Bob’s state, and it is
ρiI =
∑
jI
|EiI ,jI 〉〈EiI ,jI | , (4.1)
calculated given iT and jT . This state in Eve’s hands is a mixed state.
4.2 Purification and a related basis
We can “purify” the state while giving more information to Eve by assuming she
keeps the state
|φiI 〉 =
∑
jI
|EiI ,jI 〉|iI ⊕ jI〉 (4.2)
where we introduce another subsystem for the “purification”. Notice that the in-
dices of φ and of E are always information bits (n-bit strings). As a consequence,
we could as well have written without ambiguity |φi〉 =
∑
j |Ei,j〉|i ⊕ j〉 where
the sum is taken over all n-bit strings j that can serve as index in |Ei,j〉. We will do
this when expressions do not involve test bits. The term purification means differ-
ent things in different papers, thus we explain it a bit more: A mixed state can also
be obtained from a pure state in an enlarged system (the original system plus an
ancilla), once the ancilla is traced out; the pure state of the enlarged system (or its
density matrix) is called a purification of the mixed state. In a more general case,
the state in the enlarged system is not necessarily pure, and then we refer to it as a
“lift-up” [7] of the state of the original system.
The resulting purified state (i.e., any purification or any lift-up of Eve’s states,
for instance, the purification ρi = |φi〉〈φi|), is at least as informative to Eve as ρiI
(of Eq. 4.1) is. This is because the density matrix ρiI is exactly the same as Eve’s
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state would be if Eve ignored the iI ⊕ jI register of φ. Thus, any information Eve
can obtain from her mixed state is bounded by the information she could get if the
purified state was available to her.
Note that the overlap between these purified states satisfies
〈φl|φl⊕k〉 =
∑
j
∑
j′
〈El,j |El⊕k,j′ 〉〈l ⊕ j|l ⊕ k ⊕ j′〉
=
∑
j
〈El,j |El⊕k,j⊕k〉 , (4.3)
where all the indices are n-bit strings.
As a consequence of Lemma 3.5 we immediately get for the information bits
that 〈φl|φl⊕k〉 is independent of l [meaning, independent of iI , see Eq. (4.2)].
Thus, it is only a function of k (namely, kI ), and we can write this as
Corollary 4.1
Φk ≡ 〈φl|φl⊕k〉 .
For the 2n Hilbert-space spanned by the purified states |φl〉 (corresponding to
information bits), we define a Fourier basis {|η〉}, and show that it is possible to
compute a bound on Eve’s information about the information bits, once the purified
states are expressed in this basis.
Definition 4.1
|ηi〉 = 1
2n
∑
l
(−1)i·l|φl〉 ; d2i = 〈ηi|ηi〉 ; ηˆi = ηi/di
Using the above definitions and (1/2n)
∑
l(−1)(i⊕j)·l = δij , Eve’s purified state
can be rewritten as:
|φi〉 =
∑
l
(−1)i·l|ηl〉 =
∑
l
(−1)i·ldl|ηˆl〉 . (4.4)
Note that 〈ηi|ηi〉 = 122n
∑
l
∑
k(−1)i·k〈φl|φl⊕k〉 = 12n
∑
k(−1)i·kΦk. In
terms of Eve’s states we can write
d2i = 〈ηi|ηi〉 =
1
22n
∑
l
∑
k
(−1)i·k
∑
j
〈El,j |El⊕k,j⊕k〉b,s . (4.5)
Proposition 4.1 For symmetrized attacks, 〈ηj |ηi〉 = 0 if i 6= j.
Proof Note that 〈ηj |ηi〉 = 122n
∑
l(−1)(i⊕j)·l
∑
k(−1)i·k〈φl|φl⊕k〉.
Since 〈φl|φl⊕k〉 ≡ Φk is independent of l, we see that:
〈ηj |ηi〉 = 1
22n
∑
l
(−1)(i⊕j)·l
∑
k
(−1)i·kΦk
=
1
2n
δi,j
∑
k
(−1)i·kΦk
= δi,j〈ηi|ηi〉 ⊓⊔
The above proposition is used to prove Lemma 4.2.
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4.3 Eve’s state and probability of errors induced on information bits
In this subsection we show that the probability of any error string Eve would have
induced if the conjugate basis was used for the information bits, is a simple func-
tion of the dis (of Definition 4.1), hence a function of the overlap of Eve’s purified
states. For any attack (iT and jT being fixed once and for all), any b and s, we have
P [CI = cI | iI , iT , jT , b, s] = 〈EiI ,iI⊕cI |EiI ,iI⊕cI 〉b,s . (4.6)
See Eq. (3.23).
For any symmetrized attack and any b and s the error distribution in the infor-
mation bits is
P sym[CI = cI | iT , jT , b, s]
=
∑
iI
P sym[CI = cI | iI , iT , jT , b, s]psym(iI | iT , jT , b, s)
=
1
2n
∑
iI
〈EsymiI ,iI⊕cI |E
sym
iI ,iI⊕cI 〉b,s , (4.7)
namely, the average probability of an error syndrome cI on the information bits
(when the test bits, basis and sequence are given). The first equality is derived
using standard probability theory (p(a) = ∑b p(a|b)p(b)) and the second is due
to Eq. (3.25) and Eq. (4.6).
Identity (4.7) applies for all strings b and s and, in particular, for b0 = b ⊕ s
we get
P sym[CI = cI | iT , jT , b0, s] = 1
2n
∑
iI
〈EsymiI ,iI⊕cI |E
sym
iI ,iI⊕cI 〉b0,s . (4.8)
The basis b0 is a basis where the basis for the test bits is the same as b, but the
basis for each information bit is opposite. With a little algebra, as shown in Ap-
pendix C.4, we can express |EsymiI ,iI⊕cI 〉b0,s in terms of the |E
sym
iI ,iI⊕cI 〉b,s. Then,
doing this for the right-hand side of Eq. (4.8) we get the right-hand side of Eq.
(4.5) with i = cI ; this means that we get the following
Lemma 4.1
P sym
[
CI = cI | iT , jT , b0, s
]
= d2cI . (4.9)
The proof is presented in Appendix C.4. Note that the di used here are those of the
symmetrized attack.
Put differently, the term d2cI defined in terms of the actual bases used by Alice
and Bob is equal to the probability of the error syndrome cI on information bits
had Alice and Bob used the conjugate bases on information bits. As we shall soon
see, these dis actually provide a measure of the information Eve could get from her
purified states, therefore leading to a novel information versus disturbance result.
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4.4 Bounds on Eve’s information – the one-bit key case
In this subsection we much improve upon a result obtained in [7] (the result was
derived for the collective attack). Eve’s information about a particular bit of the
final key (even if all other bits of the final key are given to her) is bounded. We
take into consideration the error-correction data that is given to Eve, and we do
it more efficiently than in [7], hence we obtain a much better threshold for the
allowed error-rate.
Let us first discuss a one-bit final key a, defined to be the parity of a substring
of the input iI . The substring is defined using a mask v, meaning that the secret
key is a = v · iI . (In the general case, the key is defined as the string a = iIPTPA
where PPA is an m × n matrix; c.f. subsection 2.1, item II. 7). Bob first corrects
his errors using the error correction code data, hence he learns Alice’s string iI .
Eve does not know iI , but she learns the error correcting code C used by Alice
and Bob as well as v and the parity bits ξ sent by Alice to help Bob correct the
sequence he received. All the possible inputs iI that have the correct parities ξ for
the code C form a set denoted Cξ = {iI | iIP⊤C = ξ}.
When the purification of Eve’s state is given by |φi〉 the density matrix is ρi =
|φi〉〈φi|. In order to guess the key a = v · i, Eve must now distinguish between
two ensembles of states: The ensemble of equally likely states ρi (these states
are equally likely due to Corollary 3.2), with iI ∈ Cξ (i.e. iIP⊤C = ξ) and key
a = iI · v = 0, and the ensemble of (equally likely) states ρi with iI ∈ Cξ and
key a = iI · v = 1. For a ∈ {0, 1} these ensembles are represented by the density
matrices ρ0 = ρ0(v, ξ) and ρ1 = ρ1(v, ξ) defined by:
ρa(v, ξ) =
1
2n−(r+1)
∑
iIP
⊤
C
=ξ
iI ·v=a
ρi (4.10)
and Eve’s goal is to distinguish between those two. Note that the two density ma-
trices ρa(v, ξ) are the lift-ups of the density matrices really known to Eve, namely,
matrices in which the sum is over the states of Eq. (4.1) rather than a sum over
their purifications.
A good measure for the distinguishability of ρ0(v, ξ) and ρ1(v, ξ) is the opti-
mal mutual information (known as the accessible information) that one could get
if one needs to guess the bit a by performing an optimal measurement to distin-
guish between the two density matrices, when the two are given with equal prob-
ability (of half). This information will be called the Shannon Distinguishability
(SD = SD(ρ0, ρ1)) to emphasize that it is a distinguishability measure. If v is the
string used to define the one-bit key A sent by Alice, then, due to the optimality
of SD, we get (for any symmetric attack)
I(A;Esym|iT , jT , b, s, ξ) ≤ SD(ρ0(v, ξ), ρ1(v, ξ)) (4.11)
where Esym is the random variable corresponding to Eve’s actual measurement in
the symmetrized attack.
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Let v1, . . . , vr be the rows of the r × n parity check matrix PC of the (n, k, d)
code C where r = n−k. The matrix PC is assumed of rank r and so, the r “parity-
check strings” v1, v2, . . . vr (that are known to Eve) are linearly independent. Let
Vr be the r-dimensional linear space generated by {v1, . . . , vr}. Then, Vr = {vs |
s ∈ {0, 1}r} where, by definition10 vs =
∑r
l=1 slvl. For any vs ∈ Vr, Eve knows
iI · vs because she knows all the ξl and iI · vs = ξs where ξs =
∑r
l=1 slξl. As a
consequence, Eve has total knowledge of the key if a = iI · vs for vs ∈ Vr. Notice
that Vr is nothing but the dual code C⊥ of C which can be viewed as the set of all
the parity strings for C.
For any v ∈ {0, 1}n, let vˆ be the minimum Hamming distance dH(v, C⊥)
between v and all the strings in C⊥. This means that
vˆ = min
v′∈C⊥
dH(v, v
′) = min
v′∈C⊥
|v ⊕ v′| .
The value vˆ will prove to be a security parameter. We use here, as in [7], Eve’s puri-
fied states |φi〉 =
∑
l(−1)i·ldl|ηˆl〉, and the resulting density matrices of Eq. (4.10).
We now show that
Lemma 4.2 For any ξ ∈ {0, 1}r, any (n, k, d) code C with r × n parity check
matrix PC of rank r = n − k and any v /∈ C⊥ the Shannon distinguishability
between the parity 0 and the parity 1 of the information bits over the PA string, v,
is bounded above by the following inequality:
SD(ρ0(v, ξ), ρ1(v, ξ)) ≤ 2
√∑
|l|≥ vˆ
2
d2l , (4.12)
where vˆ = dH(v, C⊥) is the minimum Hamming distance between v and C⊥ and
ρb(v, ξ) is defined by Eq. (4.10).
See proof in Appendix D.2. As that proof was developed from methods used in [7]
we present in Appendix D.1 the preliminary analysis we did for the joint attack,
an analysis that was based on using the tools of [7]. Appendix D.2 then presents
improved tools leading to the result described in Lemma 4.2. Appendix D.2 is self
contained yet reading Appendix D.1 may help the reader to better understand the
motivation and the development of the tools used for this proof.
The result of Lemma 4.2 gives an upper bound for Eve’s information about the
bit defined by this privacy amplification string v. In order to get a useful result,
namely, an information versus disturbance result, we now prove a proposition in
which the bound on Eve’s information is expressed in terms of the probability of
error on the information bits in the conjugate basis.
Proposition 4.2 For any ξ ∈ {0, 1}r, any (n, k, d) code C with r× n parity check
matrix PC of rank r = n− k and any v /∈ C⊥
I(A;Esym | iT , jT , b, s, ξ) ≤ 2
√
P sym
[
|CI | ≥ vˆ
2
| iT , jT , b0, s
]
(4.13)
10 Note that the vector s is used now to define the possible vectors vs in the span of the
parity-check strings [this is in addition to s being used as the 2n-bit string defining the test
bits and the information bits]; The bit sl is the l’th bit of s.
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where vˆ = dH(v, C⊥) is the minimum Hamming distance between v and C⊥,
cI = iI ⊕ jI , ξ = iIP⊤C , the key is a = iI · v and b0 = b⊕ s.
Proof
I(A;Esym | iT , jT , b, s, ξ) ≤ SD(ρ0(v, ξ), ρ1(v, ξ)) by Eq. (4.11)
≤ 2
√∑
|l|≥ vˆ
2
d2l by Lemma (4.2)
= 2
√∑
|l|≥ vˆ
2
P sym[CI = l | iT , jT , b0, s] by Lemma (4.1)
= 2
√
P sym
[
|CI | ≥ vˆ
2
| iT , jT , b0, s
]
. ⊓⊔
Notice that the bound obtained in the previous proposition holds for all ξ, that is,
it is the same whatever is the syndrome sent by Alice to Bob to help him correct
his information bits.
Equation (4.13) bounds the information of Eve (about a one-bit key) using
the probability of the error strings in the other basis, and it completes the basic
information versus disturbance result of our proof. Previous security proofs (for
simpler attacks), such as [17,9,7] are also based on various information versus
disturbance arguments, since the non-classicality of QKD is manifested via such
arguments.
The result is expressed using classical terms: Eve’s information is bounded us-
ing the probability of error strings with large Hamming weight. If only error strings
with low weight have non-zero probability, Eve’s information becomes zero. Such
a result is a “low weight” property and it resembles a similar result with this name
which was derived by Yao [35] for the security analysis of the error-free quantum
oblivious transfer (and QKD).
4.5 Bounds on Eve’s information – the m-bit key case
The case of an m-bit key a is closely related to the one-bit case. The only differ-
ences are that the upper bound is multiplied by m, and that vˆ is defined differently
in order to take into account the privacy amplification code (in addition to the
error-correction code).
In terms of the bound [the R.H.S. of Eq. (4.13)], the case of an m bit key a
follows from that of a one-bit key if we use the following lemma:
Lemma 4.3 LetA = (A1, . . . ,Am) be defined by m random variables. Let E be
any random variable. If I(A1;E) ≤ F and for all j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m − 1 and all
a1, . . . , aj , I(Aj+1;E | a1 . . . aj) ≤ F then I(A;E) ≤ mF .
Proof Note that
I(Aj+1;E | A1 . . .Aj) =
∑
a1...aj
P (a1, . . . , aj)I(Aj+1;E | a1 . . . aj)
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≤
∑
a1...aj
P (a1, . . . , aj)F ≤ F .
The lemma follows from the above and the chain rule for information (see Ap-
pendix B.1),
I(A;E) = I(A1,A2, . . . ,Am;E) =
m∑
j=1
I(Aj ;E | A1, . . . ,Aj−1) .
⊓⊔
Next, in the particular case at hand, we want to bound Eve’s information about
the m-bit key given the values iT , jT , b, s and ξ she learned. This means we want
to bound I(A;Esym | iT , jT , b, s, ξ) where A is the m-bit key. This is nothing
but a mutual information between A and Esym for some fixed (known) values of
random outputs, and the above lemma thus applies. More precisely, it tells us that
if some number F is an upper bound for I(Aj+1;Esym | iT , jT , b, s, ξ, a1 . . . aj)
then mF will be an upper bound for I(A;Esym; iT , jT , b, s, ξ). Announcing ξ and
a1 . . . aj is announcing publicly the bits v1 · iI , . . ., vr+j · iI , which is just the
same as using the r + j strings v1, . . . vr+j as parity strings of a code for which
Proposition 4.2 applies. More formally,
Proposition 4.3 Let v1, . . . , vr+m be r+m linearly independentn-strings and Vr′
be the subspace of {0, 1}n spanned by {v1, . . . , vr′} (1 ≤ r′ ≤ r +m). Let PC be
the matrix whose rows are v1, . . . , vr and PPA the one with rows vr+1, . . . , vr+m.
Then for any ξ ∈ {0, 1}r
I(A;Esym | iT , jT , b, s, ξ) ≤ 2m
√
P sym
[
|CI | ≥ vˆ
2
| iT , jT , b0, s
]
(4.14)
where vˆ = minr≤r′<r+m dH(vr′+1, Vr′), cI = iI ⊕ jI , ξ = iIP⊤C , a = iIP⊤PA
and b0 = b⊕ s.
Proof See Appendix C.5.
If we modify vˆ to any value that is less than or equal to the minimum over all
the Hamming distances dH(vr′+1, Vr′) then equation (4.14) is satisfied with the
modified vˆ as well, as only the RHS increases. In particular this is true if we follow
the definition given in Subsection 2.1 in item II. 7; thus we define vˆ to be (from
now on) the minimal distance between any string v in the set of PA parity-check
strings, and any string v′ in the span of their union with the parity-check-strings of
the ECC (the dual to the code). This formally means:
Corollary 4.2 Let v1, . . . , vr+m be r + m linearly independent n-strings. Let
PC be the matrix whose rows are v1, . . . , vr and PPA the one with rows
vr+1, . . . , vr+m. Let V excr′ be the 2r+m−1-dimensional subspace of {0, 1}n
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spanned by a subset of the r +m− 1 parity strings which excludes the PA string
vr′ (namely, the span of v1, . . . , vr′−1, vr′+1, . . . , vr+m). Then for any ξ ∈ {0, 1}r
I(A;Esym | iT , jT , b, s, ξ) ≤ 2m
√
P sym
[
|CI | ≥ vˆ
2
| iT , jT , b0, s
]
(4.15)
where vˆ = minr+1≤r′≤r+m dH(vr′ , V excr′ ), cI = iI ⊕ jI , ξ = iIP⊤C , a = iIP⊤PA
and b0 = b⊕ s.
[First remark: in fact, for binary linear codes, the two vˆ defined above, the one
used in Proposition 4.3 and the one used in Proposition4.2 are equal, but this fact
is irrelevant for our paper.
Second remark: we could even follow a stricter definition and replace vˆ by d⊥, the
minimum (non-zero) distance of the code Vr+m of dimension r + m (the space
spanned by the ECC and PA strings v1, . . . , vr+m, see Subsection 2.1, item II. 7).
Notice that the rows of the generator matrix of this code are those of PC and PPA.]
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5 Completing the Security Proof
In this section we analyze the attack on the test and information qubits together (cf
Eq. 3.16). For these states, we bound the weighted average of Eve’s information
〈I′Eve〉, used in the alternative security criteria [see Eq. (2.4)]:∑
cT |T=pass
P [CT = cT ] I(A;E|IT ,CT = cT ,B,S,Ξ) .
We show that the above bound is exponentially small and therefore Lemma 2.1
promises us that security is achieved. We generalize here previous (and more lim-
ited) proofs [5,8,7] that information about parity bits is exponentially small, to
be applicable for the most general attack on the channel — the joint attack. [A
remark: We freely switch below between cT and jT whenever iT is given.]
5.1 Applying the bounds to all attacks
The maximum error rate that still passes the test is denoted pa (or pallowed). This
means that T = pass if and only if |cT | ≤ npa. For vˆ as defined in Corollary 4.2,
and making use of that corollary we get, for fixed b and s:
Lemma 5.1 ∑
|cT |≤npa
P sym [CT = cT |b, s] I(A;Esym | IT ,CT = cT , b, s,Ξ)
≤ 2m
√
P sym
[
(|CI | > vˆ
2
) ∧ ( |CT |
n
≤ pa) | b0, s
]
.
The proof is given in Appendix C.6.
Let U (and E) be some arbitrary attack and {U sym, E sym} an arbitrary sym-
metrized attack resulting from U . As the Lemma above is true for any symmetric
attack, it is also true for any {U sym, E sym} and in particular for the optimal one
(in which the optimal POVM is performed for each value of iT , b, . . .) Thus, we
immediately get from Lemma 5.1
Corollary 5.1 ∑
|cT |≤npa
P sym [CT = cT |b, s]max I(A;Esym | IT ,CT = cT , b, s,Ξ)
≤ 2m
√
P sym
[
(|CI | > vˆ
2
) ∧ ( |CT |
n
≤ pa) | b0, s
]
with the maximum [max I( )] defined in Eq. (3.13).
We now prove that the above bound, with the same definition of vˆ, also applies
to the original unsymmetrized attack (b and s still fixed).
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Lemma 5.2 ∑
|cT |≤npa
P [CT = cT |b, s] I(A;E | IT ,CT = cT , b, s,Ξ)
≤ 2m
√
P
[
(|CI | > vˆ
2
) ∧ ( |CT |
n
≤ pa) | b0, s
]
Proof This follows from Lemma 3.3, Corollary 5.1 and equations (3.11, 3.12)
from Corollary 3.1:∑
|cT |≤npa
P [CT = cT |b, s] I(A;E | IT ,CT = cT , b, s,Ξ)
=
∑
|cT |≤npa
P sym [CT = cT |b, s] I(A;E | IT ,CT = cT , b, s,Ξ) by Eq. (3.12)
≤
∑
|cT |≤npa
P sym [CT = cT |b, s] max I(A;Esym | IT ,CT = cT , b, s,Ξ) by Lemma 3.3
≤ 2m
√
P sym
[
(|CI | > vˆ
2
) ∧ ( |CT |
n
≤ pa) | b0, s
]
by Corollary 5.1
By Eq. (3.11),P sym [CI = cI ,CT = cT | b, s] = P [CI = cI ,CT = cT | b, s] for
any basis string, in particular b0; this concludes the proof. ⊓⊔
From now on, there will be no restriction of symmetry on the attacks. The results
will hold for any attack whatsoever.
5.2 Exponentially-small bound on Eve’s information
For any ǫsec and pa, such that vˆ ≥ 2n(pa + ǫsec) Lemma 5.2 leaves the following
bound:
Corollary 5.2 ∑
|cT |≤npa
P [CT = cT |b, s] I(A;E | IT ,CT = cT , b, s,Ξ)
≤ 2m
√
P
[
(
|CI |
n
> pa + ǫsec) ∧ ( |CT |
n
≤ pa) | b0, s
]
.
Thus far, there is nothing that causes the bound on the right hand side to be a
small number. The result above is true even if Eve is told in advance the bases of
Alice and Bob (the string b), or if she is told in advance which are the test bits and
which are the used bits (the string s), two cases in which Eve easily obtains full
information about the secret key a.
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Only Eve’s lack of knowledge regarding the random strings b and s provides
an exponentially small number at the right hand side. Since Eve must fix her at-
tack before she knows the basis or the test-bits choice, we compute the average
information for a fixed attack over all bases b and test-bits choice s. Averaging
over b means that we sum over all b’s and multiply each term by the constant
p(b) = 1/22n. The averaging over b removes the dependence on the particular
basis [due to ∑b p(z|b)p(b) =∑b p(z, b) = p(z)].
Averaging over s means that we sum over all s’s and multiply each term
by the constant p(s) = 1/
(
2n
n
)
. The averaging over s removes the dependence
on the particular choice of which bits are the test bits [due to ∑s p(z|s)p(s) =∑
s P (z, s) = p(z)].
Lemma 5.3 Let T = pass iff |cT | ≤ npa, and let I′Eve be the random variable
equal to IEve = I(A;E | iT , jT , b, s, ξ) when T = pass and I′Eve = 0 otherwise.
Then for any ǫsec and pa such that pa + ǫsec ≤ vˆ/2n we get
〈I′Eve〉 ≤ 2m
√
P
[
(
|CI |
n
> pa + ǫsec) ∧ ( |CT |
n
≤ pa)
]
.
Proof We already proved (Eq. 2.4) that
〈I′Eve〉 =
∑
cT |T=pass
P [CT = cT ] I(A;E|IT ,CT = cT ,B,S,Ξ)
where T = pass iff |cT | ≤ npa. Expanding the right-hand side, we get
〈I′Eve〉 =
∑
b,s
p(b, s)
∑
|cT |≤npa
P [CT = cT |b, s] I(A;E | IT ,CT = cT , b, s,Ξ).
Using Corollary 5.2 we obtain the first bound below; then using the fact that∑
i pi
√
xi ≤
√∑
i pixi, and that p(b, s) = p(b0, s) = 2−2np(s) (b and s be-
ing chosen independently) we get the second bound; finally noting that summing
over b is the same as summing over b0, we get the third bound:
〈I′Eve〉 ≤
∑
b,s
p(b, s)2m
√
P
[
(
|CI |
n
> pa + ǫsec) ∧ ( |CT |
n
≤ pa) | b0, s
]
≤ 2m
√√√√∑
b,s
2−2np(s)P
[
(
|CI |
n
> pa + ǫsec) ∧ ( |CT |
n
≤ pa) | b0, s
]
= 2m
√
P
[
(
|CI |
n
> pa + ǫsec) ∧ ( |CT |
n
≤ pa)
]
. ⊓⊔
For a long string, the test bits and the information bits should have a similar
number of errors if the test is picked at random. The probability that they have
different numbers of errors should go to zero exponentially fast as shown in the
following lemma.
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Lemma 5.4 For any ǫ > 0, P
[
( |CI |n > pa + ǫ) ∧ ( |CT |n ≤ pa)
]
≤ e− 12nǫ2 .
Proof This follows directly from Hoeffding’s law of large numbers [22]. The de-
tails are given in Appendix C.7.
5.3 The main results
We are now in a position to state and prove our main results.
Proposition 5.1 If pa and ǫsec and the ECC+PA codes are such that pa + ǫsec ≤
vˆ/2n with vˆ = minr+mr′=r+1 dH(vr′ , V excr′ ) where dH is the Hamming distance,
vr′ is a parity-check string, and V excr′ is the 2r+m−1 space which is the span of
v1, . . . , vr′−1, vr′+1, . . . , vr+m, then
〈I′Eve〉 ≤ 2m
√
e−
1
2
nǫ2sec
where I′Eve = IEve if |cT | = |iT ⊕ jT | ≤ npa (test passed) and I′Eve = 0
otherwise.
Proof This follows immediately from Lemma 5.3 and Lemma 5.4.
Theorem 5.1 If pa and ǫsec and the ECC+PA codes are such that pa+ǫsec ≤ vˆ/2n
with vˆ = minr+mr′=r+1 dH(vr′ , V excr′ ) where dH is the Hamming distance, vr′
is a parity-check string, and V excr′ is the 2r+m−1 space which is the span of
v1, . . . , vr′−1, vr′+1, . . . , vr+m, then for any Ainfo > 0, Aluck > 0 such that
AinfoAluck = 2m and any βinfo and βluck such that βinfo + βluck = ǫ2sec/4,
P
[
(T = pass) ∧ (IEve ≥ Ainfo e−βinfon)
] ≤ Aluck e−βluckn (5.1)
where T = pass iff |cT | ≤ npa and IEve = I(A;E | iT , jT , b, s, ξ).
Proof This follows from Proposition 5.1 if we let A = 2m and β = ǫ2sec/4 in
Lemma 2.1.
Let us recall that, in addition to the security, one must also guarantee the re-
liability of the final key. Namely we need to make sure that Alice’s final key and
Bob’s final key are (almost always) identical. Note that Lemma 5.4 can be rewrit-
ten:
P [(T = pass) ∧ (|CI | > (pa + ǫrel)n)] ≤ e− 12 ǫ
2
rel
This also means that
Corollary 5.3 The probability that the test is passed and that there are more than
(pa + ǫrel)n errors in the information string is exponentially small; it is bounded
by
h = e−
1
2
nǫ2rel .
Once the ECC is chosen such that (pa + ǫrel)n errors in the information string are
corrected, Alice’s and Bob’s final keys identical except for an exponentially small
probability bounded by h. This result means that Arel = 1 and βrel = ǫ2rel/2, in the
reliability criterion of Subsection 2.5.
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5.4 The existence of codes that provide security and reliability
The above bound on Eve’s information is exponentially small, provided there is a
family of good linear ECCs satisfying also the requirement that vˆ ≥ 2n(pa+ ǫsec)
when PA strings are added. What we formally need is a family of (linear) ECC+PA
codes satisfying the following two conditions:
(1) The ECC can correct up to t = pallowed+ ǫrel errors. For this to happen, we de-
mand that the minimum distance d between the code words of the ECC satisfy
d ≥ 2t+1. Hence, a d ≥ 2t+1 = 2n(pallowed+ǫrel)+1 is sufficient. This code
can correct all the errors in the information string, except for an exponentially
small probability bounded by h (of Corollary 5.3) of having more errors in the
information string than expected.
(2) The minimum distance d⊥, of the code words in the span of the dual code and
the PA strings (hence, the augmented dual code is of dimension r+m) should
have a minimum distance d⊥ ≥ 2n(pallowed + ǫsec).
We discuss below the class of linear codes called random linear codes. Such
codes cannot be easily decoded hence their practical usefullness is limited. It may
well be that such codes can be replaced by the much more practical codes —
the Reed-Solomon codes, without losing the security and reliability proven below.
However, analyzing Reed-Solomon codes is beyond the scope of this work.
For random linear codes (RLC’s) the two requirements mentioned above can
easily be satisfied. We can generate an m-bit secret key if we pick an (n, n − r)
RLC, where r and m satisfy
H2(2pa + 2ǫrel + 1/n) < r/n
H2(2pa + 2ǫsec) +H2(2pa + 2ǫrel + 1/n) < 1−Rsecret ,
with H2 the entropy, and Rsecret ≡ m/n the bit-rate (namely, the efficiency of the
QKD scheme). If these conditions are not met then the random linear code provides
neither reliability nor security; see Appendix E. At the limit of large n and ǫ’s
close to zero we get as a bound 2H2(2pa) < 1. Then, pallowed < 5.50% satisfies
the bound and hence this is our first threshold [see Appendix E for the detailed
calculation]. It is the threshold in the case in which we want to have an exact
bound on Eve’s information and on the reliability of the final key, as a function of
parameters chosen by the designer of the QKD protocol. This is important for a
designer who needs to choose a sufficiently large n (that is not assumed to go to
infinity); then Eve’s information is bounded as in Proposition 5.1 and the reliability
is bounded as in Corollary 5.3.
Note that if we let pallowed be sufficiently close to zero then (for sufficiently
large n and small ǫ’s) a bit-rate Rsecret close to one can be obtained. Specific values
of Eve’s information, the probability of error in the final key, and the resulting bit-
rate are provided in Table 5.1; this is done by choosing ǫsec = ǫrel = ǫ (for the sake
of simplicity). As the parameters n, ǫ, and pallowed can be chosen by the designer of
the protocol, we present here 3 values of the reliability/security parameter, and we
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ǫ = 0.5% ǫ = 1% ǫ = 2%
Reliability n = 12500 0.54 1/12
Bound (h) n = 50000 0.54 1/12 1/22026
n = 200000 1/12 1/22026 4 · 10−18
n = 800000 1/22026 4 · 10−18 ≈ 10−70
n = 3200000 4 · 10−18 ≈ 10−70
ǫ = 0.5% ǫ = 1% ǫ = 2%
Rate (Rsecret = m/n) Pallowed = 2.0% 41.7% 33.5% 18.5%
Pallowed = 3.5% 18.5% 11.7% 0.007%∗
Pallowed = 5.0% 0.007%∗ † †
† Out of the allowed range (negative rate)
∗ For the case of 2Pallowed + 2ǫ = 11.0% we calculate Rsecret by solving
H2(2pa + 2ǫ) +H2(2pa + 2ǫ + 1/n) = 0.9999 −Rsecret. Here, security and reliability
can be obtained only with n > 106 or so
Table 5.1 Summary of the characteristics of a QKD protocol that uses RLC: The “Relia-
bility Bound”, h, is calculated according to Corollary 5.3, and the maximal bit rate Rsecret
is calculated by solving H2(2pa + 2ǫ) +H2(2pa + 2ǫ+ 1/n) = 0.99−Rsecret (with two
exceptions, denoted with ∗ in the table). The parameters in this table are closely related to
the parameters used in experiments: n is related to the number of photons obtained by Bob;
2n photons are used according to the used-bits-BB84 protocol and slightly more than 4n
in the conventional BB84. The error rate considered here is achieved in many experimental
setups, but might limit the distance of transmission. A photon rate of 1000 photons per sec-
ond (if we count the photons obtained by Bob) was also reported in various experiments, so
the resulting secret-key bit-rate Rsecret can be sufficient for many practical usages.
then calculate11 the reliability as a function of n, and we calculate12 the maximal
bit-rate as a function of Pallowed.
The “Reliability Bound” h is calculated according to Corollary 5.3, and (due
to the equal ǫ’s) we can then get the bound on Eve’s information (according to
Proposition 5.1), which is exactly 2m
√
h. We consider the numbers we got for
the “Reliability Bound” in the table to be “Good” when the probability of error is
1/22026 or below. However, with h = 1/22026, Eve’s information is 2m times
1/148 which means that the users cannot really enjoy the allowed bit-rate, and
must use a much smaller value for m, as Eve could then learn too much. When the
“Reliability Bound” is 4 · 10−18 or ≈ 10−70 there is clearly no problem at all with
Eve’s information, and m can be as large as the allowed bit-rate enables.
For RLC one can actually obtain a better threshold for the allowed error rate
(as first noticed by Mayers [27]), by modifying requirement (1) so that:
11 The term 1/n that appears in the parameter [2pallowed + 2ǫ + 1/n] is negligible except
in the two cases where the entire term approaches 11.0%.
12 We choose a maximal bit rate by solving H2(2pa + 2ǫ) + H2(2pa + 2ǫ + 1/n) =
0.99 −Rsecret
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(1’) The ECC can correct up to pallowed + ǫrel errors, with probability as close to 1
as we wish.
Namely, for any δˆ, the ECC can correct up to pallowed+ǫrel errors, with probability
smaller than δˆ. For RLC this is true (due to Shannon’s bound, see for instance [25])
for any code having a minimum distance d ≥ t+1 = n(pallowed + ǫrel) + 1 (rather
than d ≥ 2t + 1, that promises the success of correcting all errors), provided that
r/n > H2(pallowed + ǫrel), and that a sufficiently large n is chosen.
We show in Appendix E that requirements (1’) and (2) can be satisfied and one
can generate an m-bit secret key, if one picks an (n, n − r) RLC, where r and m
satisfy the following:
H2(pa + ǫrel + 1/n) < r/n
H2(2pa + 2ǫsec) +H2(pa + ǫrel + 1/n) < 1−Rsecret ,
where Rsecret ≡ m/n. In the limit of large n and ǫ’s close to zero we get as a
bound H2(2pa) + H2(pa) < 1. Then, pallowed < 7.56% satisfies the bound and
hence this is our improved threshold (which is identical to the threshold calculated
by Mayers [27]). Note that Eve’s information is still bounded to be exponentially
small due to Theorem 5.1, but the reliability is now bounded only asymptotically
as we did not find an explicit formula for the probability δˆ of having an error (as a
function of n) when the distance is d > t+ 1.
Asymptotically, with a rate Rsecret < 1 − H2(pa) − H2(2pa) the final key is
secure and reliable for the given ECC+PA. Note, as pa goes to zero, Rsecret goes to
1, which means that (asymptotically) almost all the information bits are secret.
This threshold is based on the properties of the code, and other codes might
give worse thresholds, but might have other desired properties. Random linear
codes are not so useful as their decoding cannot be done efficiently. It is possible
to make use of methods for approximate decoding (in which we are not always
promised that the closest code word is chosen after the error correction), but the
bound on reliability then need some adjustments. It might be better to replace the
RLC by a code that can be decoded efficiently (e.g., Reed-Solomon concatenated
code, with a random seed), and add random PA strings. The Hamming distance
between the PA check-strings and the ECC check-strings is still bounded below in
the same way as for the RLC (see [27]).
Finally, it is interesting to note that the bound H2(pa) +H2(pa) < 1 (which
was neither reported by us nor by Mayers) leads to the threshold of 11%, and such
threshold was reported and proven by Shor and Preskill [33]. This probably means
that the alternative proof presented there can, in some sense, modify requirement
(2) in a way similar to the modification done here to change from (1) to (1’) above.
However, we could not see how the same modification could apply to our proof.
A well-known way to improve the threshold further is to allow two-way com-
munication as part of the ECC+PA process. This technique is known as key distil-
lation, see the basic idea described in [13]. The analysis of Eve’s density matrices
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becomes much more complicated in such a case, and we do not yet know if our
proof can easily be adjusted to allow that13.
6 Summary
We proved the security of the Bennett-Brassard (BB84) protocol for quantum key
distribution. Our proof is based on analyzing Eve’s reduced density matrices, on
a novel information versus disturbance result, on the optimality of symmetric at-
tacks, on laws of large numbers, and on various techniques that simplify the anal-
ysis of the problem.
Many of the ideas and the tools developed here can be found relevant when
proving the security of other QKD schemes: the analysis of Eve’s reduced density
matrices, the purifications of her states, the usage of that purification for finding a
relevant information versus disturbance bound, the use of Hoeffding’s law of large
numbers, the trace-norm-difference bound, etc. Other tools, such as the reduc-
tion to the used-bits-BB84 protocol, and the extensive usage of symmetry could
also provide some important insight, but are somewhat more specific to the BB84
scheme.
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A Security of BB84
In the paper we prove that used-bits-BB84 is secure. Let us now present the orig-
inal BB84 protocol and prove, by reduction, that its security follows immediately
from the security of the used-bits-BB84 protocol.
The differences between the protocols are only in the first part. The first part
of the BB84 protocol is as follows:
I. Creating the sifted key:
1. Alice and Bob choose a large integer n ≫ 1, and a number δnum, such that
1≫ δnum ≫ 1/
√
(2n). The protocol uses n′′ = (4 + δnum)n bits.
2. Alice randomly selects two n′′-bit strings, b′′ and i′′, which are then used to
create qubits: The string b′′ determines the basis 0 ≡ z, and 1 ≡ x of the
qubits. The string i′′ determines the value (0 or 1) of each of the n′′ qubits (in
the appropriate bases).
3. Bob randomly selects an n′′-bit string, b′′Bob, which determines Bob’s later
choice of bases for measuring each of the n′′ qubits.
4. Alice generates n′′ qubits according to her selection of b′′ and i′′, and sends
them to Bob via a quantum communication channel.
5. After receiving the qubits, Bob measures in the basis b′′Bob.
6. Alice and Bob publish the bases they used; this step should be performed only
after Bob received all the qubits.
7. All qubits with different bases are discarded by Alice and Bob. Thus, Alice
and Bob finally have n′ ≈ n′′/2 bits for which they used the same bases b′.
The n′-bit string would be identical for Alice and Bob if Eve and natural noise
do not interfere.
8. Alice selects the first 2n bits from the n′-bit string, and the rest of the n′ bits
are discarded. If n′ < 2n the protocol is aborted (a fake random key can be
chosen in this case via the unjammable classical channel, so that the key is not
secret; however the probability for this to happen is exponentially small).
We shall refer to the resulting 2n-bit string as the sifted key.
The second part of the protocol is identical to the second part of the used-bits-
BB84 protocol. To prove that BB84 is secure let us modify BB84 by a few steps in
a way that each step can only be helpful to Eve, and the final protocol is the used-
bits-BB84. Each item below describes a different protocol, obtained by modifying
the previous protocol.
Recall that Alice and Bob choose their strings of basis b′′ and b′′Bob in advance.
Recall that the two strings are random. Thus, the first modification below has no
influence at all on the security or the analysis of the BB84 protocol. Note that after
the first modification Alice knows the un-used bits in advance. The second and
the third modifications are done in a way that Eve can only gain, hence security
of the resulting protocol provides the security of BB84. The last modification is
only “cosmetic”, in order to derive precisely the used-bits-BB84 protocol. This
modification changes nothing in terms of Eve’s ability.
– Let Bob have a quantum memory. Let Alice choose b′′Bob instead of Bob at
step 3. When Bob receives the qubits at step 5, let him keep the qubits in a
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memory, and tell Alice he received them. In step 6, let Alice announce b′′Bob
to Bob, and Bob measures in bases b′′Bob.
From the announcements of b′′ and b′′Bob Bob knows which are the used and
the un-used bits, as determined in steps 7 and 8. Now, at the end of step 8,
Alice and Bob know all the un-used bits, so they ignore them, to be left with
2n bits.
Note that in this modified protocol, Alice can calculate which are the un-used
bits already at step 3 (if she wishes to know this).
– Let Alice calculate the un-used bits and announce them already at the end of
step 3. Let her also announce their bases (bAliceun-used and bBobun-used) and bits-values
iun-used. Obviously, such announcements can only help Eve to gain more infor-
mation (and maybe even to chose a better attack). Thus this step only reduces
the security, so if the protocol defined here is secure, so is the original BB84
protocol.
– Let Alice generate and send to Bob only the used bits in step 4, and let her
ask Eve to send the un-used bits (by telling her which these are, and also the
preparation data for the relevant subsets, that is—bAliceun-used and iun-used). Knowing
which are the used bits, and knowing their bases and values can only help Eve
in designing her attack, thus security can only be reduced by this step.
Since Bob never uses the values of the unused bits in the protocol (he only
ignores them), he doesn’t care if Eve doesn’t provide him these bits or provide
them to him without following Alice’s preparation request.
After Bob receives the used and unused bits, let him give Eve the unused qubits
(without measuring them), and ask her to measure them in bases bBobun-used. Hav-
ing these qubits can only help Eve in designing her optimal final measurement,
thus security can only be reduced by this step.
Since Bob never use the values of the unused bits in the rest of the protocol, he
doesn’t care if Eve doesn’t provide him these values correctly or at all.
– Since Alice and Bob never made any use of the unused bits, Eve could have
them as part of her ancilla to start with, and Alice could just create 2n bits,
send them to Bob, and then tell him the bases.
The protocol obtained after this reduction, is a protocol in which Eve has full
control on her qubits and on the unused qubits. Alice and Bob have control on
the preparation and measurement of the used bits only. This is the used-bits
BB84, for which we prove security in the text.
One important remark is that the exponentially small probability that n′ < 2n
in Step 8 (so that the protocol is aborted due to insufficient number of bits in the
sifted key) now becomes a probability that Eve learns the key.
Another important remark is that the issue of high loss rate of qubits (e.g., due
to losses in transmission or detection) can also be handled via the same reduction.
Thus, our proof could apply also to a more practical BB84 protocol where high
losses are allowed. The required modification to the protocol then is that Bob now
will not add missing qubits, in step I.3 of the used-bits BB84 protocol, and in an
additional step (prior to step I.4.) he will inform Alice of the bits he did not obtain.
By the way, another practical aspect is imperfect sources (in which the created
states are not described by a two-level system). This subject is the issue of recent
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subtlety regarding the security of practical schemes [12,11], and it is not discussed
in this current work.
B Information Theoretic Basics and Results
B.1 Basics of information theory [14]
Let X and Y be random variables whose values are indexed by x and y re-
spectively, appearing with probabilities p(x) and p(y). The entropy of a ran-
dom variable is H(X) = −∑x p(x) log2 p(x). For two variables H(X|y) =
−∑x p(x|y) log2 p(x|y) and H(X|Y) ≡∑y p(y)H(X|y). For any two random
variables X and Y, the mutual information I(X;Y) = H(X) − H(X | Y) de-
scribes the decrease in the entropy of X due to learning Y; This function I is
symmetric to swappingX andY.
For three random variables A, E, and X given to be x, the conditional mu-
tual information is I(A;E | x) = H(A | x) − H(A | E, x) Then, the con-
ditional mutual information for the three random variables is I(A;E | X) ≡∑
x p(x)I(A;E | x). Another case which is relevant is with four random vari-
ablesA,E,X andY given to be equal to y, I(A;E | X, y) =∑x p(x|y)I(A;E |
x, y).
An important tool is the chain rule I(A,B;C) = I(A;C)+ I(B;C | A). As
a corollary from the chain rule and the positivity of mutual information, one gets
I(A,B;C) ≥ I(B;C | A).
B.2 Bad Security Criteria
B.2.1 A first bad security criterion and the SWAP attack: What one might like to
obtain as a security criterion is that Eve’s information given that the test is passed,
is negligible. Formally, this puts a restriction on the values of jT : for any iT , only
jT such that |jT ⊕ iT | ≤ npa are allowed. Then, the criterion is
I(A;E | IT ,JT ,B,S,Ξ,T = pass) ≤ A e−βn (B.1)
with A and β positive constants, and I(A;E | IT ,JT ,B,S,Ξ,T = pass) =∑
iT ,jT ,b,s,ξ
p(iT , jT , b, s, ξ | T = pass)I(A;E | iT , jT , b, s, ξ,T = pass), with
cT = iT ⊕ jT , and T = pass meaning that cT ≤ npa.
Unfortunately, the above bound is too demanding and is not satisfied in quan-
tum cryptography. Given that the test is passed, Eve can still have full information.
Consider the SWAP attack: Eve takes Alice’s qubits and puts them into a quantum
memory. She sends random BB84 states to Bob. Eve measures the qubits she kept
after learning their bases, hence gets full information about Alice’s final key. In
this case, Bob will almost always abort the protocol because it is very unlikely that
his bits will pass the test. However, in the rare event when the test is passed, Eve
has full information about Alice’s key. So, given the test is passed (a rare event),
information is still m bits, and the above criterion cannot be satisfied.
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B.2.2 A second bad security criteria and the half-SWAP attack: Another poten-
tial security criterion says the following: “For any attack, either Eve’s average
information is negligible or the probability that the test is passed is negligible”.
Namely, if Eve tries an attack that would give her non-negligible information about
a final key, she has to be extremely lucky in order to pass the test. This security
criterion can be formally written as 〈IEve〉P (T = pass) ≤ A e−βn with A and
β positive constants. This suggested security criterion is different from the previ-
ously suggested one, and it is satisfied by the SWAP attack mentioned above.
Unfortunately, as observed in an earlier (archive) version of [27], this criterion
is also inappropriate. Consider the half-SWAP attack in which Eve does nothing
with probability half, and performs the SWAP attack with probability half. This
half-SWAP attack gives an average information of exactly m/2, and it passes the
test with probability larger than half. Obviously these two cases, getting a non-
negligible information, and passing the test with high probability, will not happen
in the same event, hence security can still be achieved, but it must be defined via
less demanding criteria, such as those two used in the paper.
B.3 Alternative Security Criteria
B.3.1 Finding different expressions for 〈I′Eve〉: First, we prove Eq.(2.3) namely,
that 〈I′Eve〉 = I(A;E | IT ,JT ,B,S,Ξ,T = pass)P [T = pass].
By expanding of 〈I′Eve〉 we get:
〈I′Eve〉 =
∑
iT ,jT :|iT⊕jT |≤npa
∑
b,s,ξ
I(A;E | iT , jT , b, s, ξ)p(iT , jT , b, s, ξ)
=
∑
iT ,jT ,b,s,ξ
I(A;E | iT , jT , b, s, ξ)p(iT , jT , b, s, ξ | T = pass)P (T = pass)
=
∑
iT ,jT ,b,s,ξ
I(A;E | iT , jT , b, s, ξ,T = pass)p(iT , jT , b, s, ξ | T = pass)P (T = pass)
= [
∑
iT ,jT ,b,s,ξ
I(A;E | iT , jT , b, s, ξ,T = pass)p(iT , jT , b, s, ξ | T = pass)]P (T = pass)
= I(A;E | IT ,JT ,B,S,Ξ,T = pass)P [T = pass]
Indeed, p(iT , jT , b, s, ξ | pass)p(pass) = p(iT , jT , b, s, ξ, pass) and this value is
equal to p(iT , jT , b, s, ξ) if |iT ⊕ jT | ≤ npa and is 0 otherwise. When the value
is not 0, then the condition pass is automatically satisfied and can be put in the
right-hand side of the mutual information.
Second, we prove in full details Eq.(2.4) namely, that 〈I′Eve〉 =∑
|cT |≤npa P [CT = cT ]I(A;E | IT ,CT = cT ,B,S,Ξ).
Note that I′Eve is the random variable equal to I(A;E | iT , jT , b, s, ξ) when
|iT ⊕ jT | ≤ npa (i.e. when T = pass) and to 0 otherwise. As a consequence,
〈I′Eve〉 =
∑
iT ,jT ,b,s,ξ
I
′
Eve(iT , jT , b, s, ξ)p(iT , jT , b, s, ξ)
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=
∑
|cT |≤npa
∑
iT ,b,s,ξ
I(A;E | iT ,CT = cT , b, s, ξ)P [iT ,CT = cT , b, s, ξ]
=
∑
|cT |≤npa
∑
iT ,b,s,ξ
I(A;E | iT ,CT = cT , b, s, ξ)P [iT , b, s, ξ | cT ]P [CT = cT ]
=
∑
|cT |≤npa
P [CT = cT ]I(A;E | IT ,CT = cT ,B,S,Ξ)
B.3.2 Security against the Half-SWAP Attack: In the half-SWAP attack Eve has
a probe |p〉 where p is a 2n-bit string. With probability half she applies the unitary
transform U0|p〉|i〉b = |p〉|i〉b (she does nothing and then sends |i〉b to Bob) and
with probability half she applies the unitary transform U1|p〉|i〉b = |i〉b|p〉 (swap)
and sends |p〉 to Bob, keeping the probe in the state |i〉b. We can present a fully-
quantum attack, and let Eve use an additional single-qubit probe |e0〉 initially in
the state H |0〉, so that her full probe contains 2n+ 1 qubits. Her attack is defined
by the unitary transform
U |0〉|p〉|i〉b = |0〉|p〉|i〉b
U |1〉|p〉|i〉b = |1〉|i〉b|p〉
which means that she uses her additional qubit |e0〉 to decide whether she swaps or
not (using 2n Controlled-SWAP gates). Let us describe Eve’s measurement: she
measures her new bit e0 in the standard basis and then, if she gets e0 = 1, she
measures the “probe” |e1〉 = |i〉b in the basis b and gets i, else she measures her
original probe |p〉 in the standard basis and gets p. Her two outputs (e0, e1), equal
to either (0, p) or (1, i), define the random variable E = (E0,E1) (respectively).
Formulated that way, the half-SWAP attack fits better our framework. Notice that
p and a (Alice’s final key) are completely uncorrelated and that i determines com-
pletely a after the ECC and PA steps are completed.
Now let us look at our security criteria, and observe I(A;E |
IT ,JT ,B,S,Ξ, pass)P [T = pass]. Of course p(pass) = 1/2. It is however a
big mistake to believe that I(A;E | IT ,JT ,B,S,Ξ, pass) is equal to m or m/2.
Eve’s information is equal to m if the following two conditions are satisfied:
– the test is passed
– she applied the SWAP attack
otherwise, she gets 0 information. So Eve’s information is m times the probability
that both the test is passed and she applied the SWAP attack, which is equal to
1/2 times the probability of passing the test when she swaps. This is exponentially
small.
In order to make this intuitive reasoning formal, let us use (a particular case
of) the chain rule for mutual information (see Appendix B.1):
I(E;A) ≡ I(E0,E1;A) = I(E0;A) + I(E1;A | E0)
Now, E0 corresponds to a random bit generated by Eve, independently of i and
thus independently of a. As a consequence I(E0;A | iT , jT , b, s, ξ) = 0 and thus
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I(E0;A | IT ,JT ,B,S,Ξ, pass) = 0. This implies that
I(E;A | IT ,JT ,B,S,Ξ, pass)p(pass) = I(E1;A | E0, IT ,JT ,B,S,Ξ, pass)p(pass)
Now
I(E1;A | E0, iT , jT , b, s, ξ) =
∑
e0
I(E1;A | e0, iT , jT , b, s, ξ)p(e0 | iT , jT , b, s, ξ)
If e0 = 0 then E1 is just the dummy output that is independent of a and and as
a consequence I(E1;A | e0, iT , jT , b, s, ξ) = 0. On the other hand, if e0 = 1
(written “swap” hereunder) then, Eve gets full information, i.e. the m bits of the
key. We are thus left with the equality
I(E;A | iT , jT , b, s, ξ) = mp(swap | iT , jT , b, s, ξ)
where, of course, Bob’s outputs jT will depend heavily on the swap! We can now
expand
I(E;A | IT ,JT ,B,S,Ξ, pass)p(pass) = m
∑
|iT⊕jT |≤npa
∑
b,s,ξ
p(swap | iT , jT , b, s, ξ)p(iT , jT , b, s, ξ)
= mp(swap∧pass)
= mp(pass | swap)p(swap)
=
m
2
p(pass | swap)
which is exponentially small.
In fact, the half-SWAP attack does not even make I(E;A |
IT ,JT ,B,S,Ξ, pass) large since this is equal to
m
2
p(pass | swap) 1
p(pass)
= mp(pass | swap)
meaning that the first inappropriate security criteria is actually satisfied correctly
if the Half-SWAP attack is used.
C A Few Technical Lemmas
C.1 A Proof of Lemma 3.3
We prove here Eq.3.15. It is actually possible to prove equality14, but for our pur-
pose inequality is as good, so we do not bother with proving equality.
14 This is done by proving that I(A;M | IT ,CT = cT , b, s,Ξ) = 0. See the chain rule
used in the first inequality below.
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Proof Using the chain rule described in Appendix B.1, we get
I(A;E′,M | IT ,CT = cT , b, s,Ξ)
≥ I(A;E′ |M, IT ,CT = cT , b, s,Ξ)
=
∑
iT ,ξ,m
P ′ [iT , ξ,m | cT , b, s] I(A;E′ | m, iT , cT , b, s, ξ)
=
∑
iT ,ξ,m
P ′ [iT , ξ | cT , b, s,m] I(A;E′ | m, iT , cT , b, s, ξ)p(m)
For any fixed m, the effect of the symmetrizing transformation S is to replace i by
i ⊕m, (cT remaining fixed). In particular iT becomes iT ⊕mT and iI becomes
iI ⊕mI and so ξ becomes (iI ⊕mI)P⊤C = ξ ⊕mIP⊤C and so
P ′(iT , ξ | cT , b, s,m) = P (iT ⊕mT , ξ ⊕mIP⊤C | cT , b, s)
I(A;E′ | m, iT ,CT = cT , b, s, ξ) = I(A;E | iT ⊕mT ,CT = cT , b, s, ξ ⊕mIP⊤C )
If we let i′T = iT ⊕mT , ξ′ = ξ ⊕mIP⊤C and use the fact that the same value of
ξ′ is obtained 2n−r times, we get
I(A;E′,M | IT ,CT = cT , b, s,Ξ)
≥
∑
iT ,ξ,m
P ′[iT , ξ | cT , b, s,m]I(A;E′ | m, iT ,CT = cT , b, s, ξ)p(m)
= 2n−r
∑
iT ,ξ,i′T ,ξ
′
P [i′T , ξ
′ | cT , b, s]I(A;E | i′T ,CT = cT , b, s, ξ′)p(m)
= 2n−r2n+r
∑
i′
T
,ξ′
P [i′T , ξ
′ | cT , b, s]I(A;E | i′T ,CT = cT , b, s, ξ′)2−2n
=
∑
i′
T
,ξ′
P [i′T , ξ
′ | cT , b, s]I(A;E | i′T ,CT = cT , b, s, ξ′)
= I(A;E | IT ,CT = cT , b, s,Ξ) ⊓⊔
C.2 A Proof of Lemma 3.5
Using the Basic Lemma of Symmetrization (Eq. 3.7) and the fact that the |m〉 form
an orthonormal basis,
〈Esym ′i,j |Esym ′i′,j′ 〉b = 2−2n
∑
m
(−1)(i⊕j⊕i′⊕j′)·m〈E′i⊕m,j⊕m|E′i′⊕m,j′⊕m〉b .
(C.1)
By replacing i, j, i′ and j′ by i ⊕ u, j ⊕ u, i′ ⊕ u and
j′ ⊕ u in this formula, we get 〈Esym ′i⊕u,j⊕u|Esym ′i′⊕u,j′⊕u〉b =
2−2n
∑
m(−1)(i⊕j⊕i
′⊕j′)·m〈E′i⊕u⊕m,j⊕u⊕m|E′i′⊕u⊕m,j′⊕u⊕m〉b.
Defining w = u ⊕ m we get 〈Esym ′i⊕u,j⊕u|Esym ′i′⊕u,j′⊕u〉b =
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2−2n
∑
w(−1)(i⊕j⊕i
′⊕j′)·w⊕u〈E′i⊕w,j⊕w |E′i′⊕w,j′⊕w〉b, and using (C.1) we
finally get
〈Esym ′i⊕u,j⊕u|Esym ′i′⊕u,j′⊕u〉b = (−1)(i⊕j⊕i
′⊕j′)·u〈Esym ′i,j |Esym ′i′,j′ 〉b . (C.2)
Considering information and test bits, if we let u = uIuT with uT = 0 and use
the fact (Lemma 3.4) that the normalizing factor for a symmetrized attack depends
only on iT , jT , b and s (so we can divide both sides by the same normalization
factor), we deduce from (C.2) the identity
〈EsymiI⊕uI ,jI⊕uI |E
sym
i′
I
⊕uI ,j′I⊕uI 〉b,s = (−1)
(iI⊕jI⊕i′I⊕j′I)·uI 〈EsymiI ,jI |E
sym
i′
I
,j′
I
〉b,s .
(C.3)
For any n-bit string uI , we get by Eq. (C.3), by letting i′I = iI ⊕ kI , j′I =
jI ⊕ kI that (iI ⊕ jI ⊕ i′I ⊕ j′I) · uI = 0 and so
〈EsymiI⊕uI ,jI⊕uI |E
sym
iI⊕kI⊕uI ,jI⊕kI⊕uI 〉b,s = 〈E
sym
iI ,jI
|EsymiI⊕kI ,jI⊕kI 〉b,s .
By writing j = i⊕ c we get
〈EsymiI⊕uI ,jI⊕cI⊕uI |E
sym
iI⊕kI⊕uI ,iI⊕cI⊕kI⊕uI 〉b,s = 〈E
sym
iI ,iI⊕cI |E
sym
iI⊕kI ,iI⊕cI⊕kI 〉b,s ,
so that the first part of the Lemma is proven [〈EsymiI ,iI⊕cI |E
sym
iI⊕kI ,iI⊕cI⊕kI 〉 is inde-
pendent of iI .]
Summing over cI and changing back to jI we get that∑
j〈EsymiI ,jI |E
sym
iI⊕kI ,jI⊕kI 〉 is also independent of iI .
C.3 A Proof of Eq. (3.27)
We show that p(jT | iT , bI , bT , s) = p(jT | iT , b′I , bT , s) for any choice of basis
b′I on information bits. For any basis b′I , the change of basis between b′I and bI is
expressed by a unitary matrix U = (ui′
I
,iI ) such that |i′I〉b′I =
∑
iI
ui′
I
,iI |iI〉bI ,
|iI〉bI =
∑
i′
I
u†iI ,i′I |i
′
I〉b′I and, of course, UU † = U †U = 1. From the defining
equation |E′iT ,iI ,jT ,jI 〉b = b〈jT |b〈jI |U |0〉E|iT 〉b|iI〉b (Eq. 3.17) and the above,
we get
|E′iT ,i′I ,jT ,j′I 〉bT ,b′I =
∑
iI ,jI
ui′
I
,iIu
†
jI ,j′I
|E′iT ,iI ,jT ,jI 〉bT ,bI (C.4)
For any b, we have p(jT | iT , b, s) =
∑
iI
p(jT | iT , iI , b, s)p(iI | iT , b, s).
As p(iI | iT , b, s) = 1/2n (since these values are chosen at random by Alice) we
can deduce, using Eq. (3.20) p(jT |iT , iI , b, s) =
∑
jI
〈E′iT ,iI ,jT ,jI |E′iT ,iI ,jT ,jI 〉b,
that
p(jT | iT , b, s) = 1
2n
∑
jI ,iI
〈E′iT ,iI ,jT ,jI |E′iT ,iI ,jT ,jI 〉b (C.5)
If we apply Eq. (C.5) in the particular case where the basis is b′I , bT , and we
expand its right-hand side using Eq. (C.4), then, because of the unitarity of U , the
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six sums reduce to two, yielding a term that is exactly equal to the right-hand side
of Eq. (C.5) with basis b = bI , bT . That is:
p(jT | iT , b′I , bT , s) =
1
2n
∑
jI ,iI
〈E′iT ,iI ,jT ,jI |E′iT ,iI ,jT ,jI 〉b (C.6)
⊓⊔
C.4 A Proof of Lemma 4.1
We start from Eq. (4.8), namely
P sym
[
CI = cI | iT , jT , b0, s
]
=
1
2n
∑
i′
I
〈Esymi′
I
,i′
I
⊕cI |Ei′I ,i′I⊕cI 〉b0,s. (C.7)
with b0 = b ⊕ s. From Hadamard, we know that the unitary matrix U = (ui′
I
,iI )
used to express |i′I〉b¯I in terms of the |iI〉bI is defined by ui′I ,iI = 2−n/2(−1)i
′
I ·iI
and, for that particular choice of b′I , Eq. (C.4) reduces to
|Esym ′iT ,i′I ,jT ,j′I 〉bT ,b¯I =
1
2n
∑
iI ,jI
(−1)i′I ·iI (−1)jI ·j′I |Esym ′iT ,iI ,jT ,jI 〉bT ,bI
Due to Corollary 3.3 psym(jT |iT , bT , s) is independent of bI , so both sides can be
divided by the same normalization factor, and this implies that
|Esymi′
I
,j′
I
〉b0,s =
1
2n
∑
iI ,jI
(−1)(i′I ·iI+jI ·j′I)|EsymiI ,jI 〉b,s .
Then, going back to Eq. (C.7) and replacing |Esymi′
I
,i′
I
⊕cI 〉b0,s by those values, leaves
P sym[CI = cI | iT , jT , b0, s]
=
1
2n
∑
kI
∑
iI ,jI
∑
i′
I
,j′
I
1
22n
(−1)(iI⊕i′I)·kI⊕(jI⊕j′I )·(kI⊕cI)〈EsymiI ,jI |E
sym
i′
I
,j′
I
〉b,s
=
1
23n
∑
iI ,i′I ,jI ,j
′
I
(∑
kI
(−1)kI ·(iI⊕i′I⊕jI⊕j′I )
)
(−1)cI ·(jI⊕j′I )〈EsymiI ,jI |E
sym
i′
I
,j′
I
〉b,s
The sum over kI is non zero only when iI ⊕ i′I = jI ⊕ j′I ∆= hI ,
and then it is 2n, so
=
1
22n
∑
iI ,jI ,hI
(−1)cI ·hI 〈EsymiI ,jI |E
sym
iI⊕hI ,jI⊕hI 〉b,s
= 〈ηcI |ηcI 〉 = d2cI
where the last equalities are due to the calculation of the norm of η in Eq. (4.5).
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C.5 A Proof of Proposition 4.3
We prove here Proposition 4.3 that claims a bound on the m-bit key given a bound
on 1-bit key.
Proof Let F (x) = 2√P sym[|CI | ≥ x2 | iT , jT , b0, s]. For any r′ such that r ≤
r′ < r + m, let C′ be the code whose parity check matrix PC′ has the rows
v1, . . . , vr′ . Then PC′ has rank r′ and C′ is an (n, k′, d′) code with k′ = n − r′.
Moreover vr′+1 /∈ C′⊥ = Vr′ . As a consequence, Proposition 4.2 applies and gives
that
I(A′;Esym | iT , jT , b, s, ξ′) ≤ F (vˆr′+1)
for a′ = vr′+1 · iI = aj+1 with j = r′ − r, ξ′ = iIP⊤C′ = ξ1 . . . ξra1 . . . aj ,
vˆr′+1 = dH(vr′+1, Vr′) and b0 = b⊕ s. This can be rewritten
I(Aj+1;E
sym | iT , jT , b, s, ξ, a1 . . . aj) ≤ F (vˆr′+1)
and the result follows from Lemma 4.3 by taking F = maxr≤r′<r+m F (vˆr′+1) =
F (vˆ) for vˆ = minr≤r′<r+m vˆr′+1. ⊓⊔
C.6 A Proof of Lemma 5.1
The Lemma says:∑
|cT |≤npa
P sym [CT = cT |b, s] I(A;Esym | IT ,CT = cT , b, s,Ξ)
≤ 2m
√
P sym
[
(|CI | > vˆ
2
) ∧ ( |CT |
n
≤ pa) | b0, s
]
Proof If we expand IT andΞ in the expression I(A;Esym | IT ,CT = cT , b, s,Ξ)
then we get∑
|cT |≤npa
P sym [CT = cT |b, s] I(A;Esym | IT ,CT = cT , b, s,Ξ)
=
∑
|cT |≤npa,iT ,ξ
psym(iT , CT = cT , ξ | b, s)I(A;Esym | iT , cT , b, s, ξ)
=
∑
|iT⊕jT |≤npa,iT ,ξ
psym(iT , jT , ξ | b, s)I(A;Esym | iT , jT , b, s, ξ)
=
∑
|iT⊕jT |≤npa,iT ,ξ
psym(iT , jT | b0, s)2−rI(A;Esym | iT , jT , b, s, ξ) .
The last equality requires a detailed explanation: First, notice that psym(jT |
iT , b, s, ξ) = p
sym(jT | iT , b, s) because the probability psym(jT | iT , b, s, iI)
is independent of iI by Lemma (3.4) and the condition Ξ = ξ means iIP⊤C = ξ,
which is a condition on iI . As a consequence, using the fact that (for any attack)
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p(ξ | b, s) = 2−r, p(iT | b, s) = 2−n and p(iT , ξ | b, s) = p(iT | b, s)p(ξ | b, s)
[so that p(iT , ξ | b, s) = 2−(n+r)], we get
psym(iT , jT , ξ | b, s) = psym(jT | iT , b, s, ξ)psym(iT , ξ | b, s)
= psym(jT | iT , b, s, ξ)2−(n+r)
= psym(jT | iT , b, s)2−(n+r) by the above
= psym(jT | iT , b0, s)2−(n+r) by Lemma (3.6)
= 2−(n+r)[psym(iT , jT | b0, s)/psym(iT | b0, s)] by definition of p(A | B)
= psym(iT , jT | b0, s)2−r due to p(iT | b0, s) = 2−n
The result∑
|cT |≤npa
P sym [CT = cT |b, s] I(A;Esym | IT ,CT = cT , b, s,Ξ)
=
∑
|iT⊕jT |≤npa,iT ,ξ
psym(iT , jT | b0, s)2−rI(A;Esym | iT , jT , b, s, ξ)
≤
∑
|iT⊕jT |≤npa,iT ,ξ
2−rpsym(iT , jT | b0, s)2m
√
P sym
[
|CI | ≥ vˆ
2
| iT , jT , b0, s
]
now follows immediately from corollary (4.2). Using the fact that square-root is a
convex function
∑
pi
√
xi ≤
√∑
pixi so we get∑
|cT |≤npa
P sym [CT = cT |b, s] I(A;Esym | IT ,CT = cT , b, s,Ξ)
≤ 2m
√√√√ ∑
|iT⊕jT |≤npa,iT ,ξ
2−rpsym(iT , jT | b0, s)P sym
[
|CI | ≥ vˆ
2
| iT , jT , b0, s
]
Finally, we get rid of the 2−r factor by summing over ξ (each equally likely), and
we complete the proof using
∑
|iT⊕jT |≤npa,iT ,ξ
P sym
[
|CI | ≥ vˆ
2
| iT , jT , b0, s
]
psym(iT , jT | b0, s)2−r
= P sym
[
|CI | ≥ vˆ
2
, |CT | ≤ npa | b0, s
]
⊓⊔
C.7 A Proof of Lemma 5.4
Let
P
[( |CI |
n
> pa + ǫ
)
∧
( |CT |
n
≤ pa
)]
=
∑
b
p(b)hb(pa, ǫ)
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with
hb(pa, ǫ) = P
[( |CI |
n
> pa + ǫ
)
∧
( |CT |
n
≤ pa
)
| b
]
This hb(pa, ǫ) is the probability that the information bits have ǫ more than the
allowed error rate, when the test bits have less than the allowed error rate averaged
over all choices of test and information bits, for a particular basis b, and is given
by ∑
c
P
[( |CI |
n
> pa + ǫ
)
∧
( |CT |
n
≤ pa
)
| C = c, b
]
P [C = c | b]
where c is over all possible error strings on all bits, test and information. Note that
in principle P [C = c | b], can be calculated but we shall soon see that there is no
need for it.
Now we must note that
P
[( |CI |
n
> pa + ǫ
)
∧
( |CT |
n
≤ pa
)
| C = c, b
]
does not depend on the attack. And in fact, in the aforementioned expression, the
basis b is superfluous. Once the error string c is fixed, the values |cI |n and
|cT |
n
depend uniquely on the random string s. In fact |cI |n is the average of a random
sampling without replacement of n bits taken from the 2n bits c whose mean µ is
|c|
2n . From Hoeffding [22] we know that
P
[ |CI |
n
− µ ≥ ǫ
2
| c, b
]
≤ e− 12nǫ2 (C.8)
By definition |c| = |cI |+ |cT | and so
µ =
|c|
2n
=
|cI |
2n
+
|cT |
2n
Replacing µ by its value in (C.8) and simplifying, equation (C.8) becomes
P
[ |CI |
n
≥ |CT |
n
+ ǫ | C = c, b
]
≤ e− 12nǫ2 (C.9)
Now, since
(
|cI |
n
> pa + ǫ) ∧ ( |cT |
n
≤ pa) =⇒ |cI |
n
≥ |cT |
n
+ ǫ
we deduce from (C.9) that
P
[( |CI |
n
> pa + ǫ
)
∧
( |CT |
n
≤ pa
)
| C = c, b
]
≤ e− 12nǫ2
and consequently,
hb(pa, ǫ) = P
[( |CI |
n
> pa + ǫ
)
∧
( |CT |
n
≤ pa
)
| b
]
≤ e− 12nǫ2
and
P
[( |CI |
n
> pa + ǫ
)
∧
( |CT |
n
≤ pa
)]
≤ e− 12nǫ2
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D Eve’s Information Versus the disturbance
In this appendix we do not prove Lemma 4.2 immediately. We prove it later on, in
the second subsection (the tight bound). For simplicity of the presentation, we first
prove another Lemma which leads to a loose bound (with an additional factor of
2r), for which the derivation is simpler. The bulk of the loose bound was derived
in [7], and is adapted here to the analysis of the joint attack. The tight bound is an
improvement over that derivation yielding a much better threshold for pallowed: The
loose bound leads to a threshold of less than 1%, while the threshold for the tight
bound is 7.56%. One can skip directly to the second subsection if desired.
Both the loose and the tight bound are derived using the fact that the Shannon
distinguishability between the parity 0 density matrix, ρ0, and the parity 1 density
matrix, ρ1, is bounded ([7,18]) by the trace norm of ρ0 − ρ1 and using the fact
that we can easily calculate this trace norm when the purified states are given by
Eq. (4.4).
D.1 The Loose Bound
Exploiting the techniques developed in [7] (to prove security against any collective
attack) we now present a bound which is applicable to the joint attack.
We have already defined a purification of Eve’s state: |φiI 〉 =
∑
l(−1)iI ·l|ηl〉
The density matrix for such a |φiI 〉 is
ρiI = |φiI 〉〈φiI | =
∑
l,l′
(−1)iI ·(l⊕l′)dldl′ |ηˆl〉〈ηˆl′ | (D.1)
Recall that the final key is computed as b = v · iI . Eve does not know iI , but she
knows v, and she knows (from the announced ECC parity string ξ) that iI is in the
coset Cξ. Hence, in order to know the key, Eve must distinguish between the states
iI = iξ ⊕ c in Cξ that give parity b = 0 and the states iI = iξ ⊕ c in Cξ that give
parity b = 1. For b ∈ {0, 1} the reduced density matrix is
ρb(v, ξ) =
1
2n−(r+1)
∑
c∈C
v·(iξ⊕c)=b
ρiξ⊕c
=
1
2n−(r+1)
∑
c∈C
v·(iξ⊕c)=b
∑
l,l′
(−1)(iξ⊕c)·(l⊕l′)dldl′ |ηˆl〉〈ηˆl′ |
where the sum is over values c that satisfy both the condition of being a code word,
and the condition of leading to the particular parity b for the PA.
Lemma D.1 Let C be any linear code in {0, 1}n and a ∈ {0, 1}n be such that
a /∈ C⊥ then ∑
c∈C
(−1)c·a = 0 (D.2)
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Proof Let {w1, . . . , wk} be a basis of C. Define t ∈ {0, 1}k by tα = wα · a, 1 ≤
α ≤ k; a /∈ C⊥ means that t is not the zero string. Let now h : {0, 1}k → C be
defined by h(s) =
∑
1≤α≤k sαwα; then h(s) · a =
∑
sαwα · a =
∑
sαtα = s · t
and so ∑
c∈C
(−1)c·a =
∑
s
(−1)h(s)·a =
∑
s
(−1)s·t = 0
⊓⊔
Lemma D.2 For any (n, k, d) code C with r × n parity check matrix PC of rank
r = n − k, any ξ ∈ {0, 1}r and any v ∈ {0, 1}n the Shannon distinguishability
SD(ρ0(v, ξ), ρ1(v, ξ)) where
ρb(v, ξ) =
1
2n−(r+1)
∑
iIP
⊤
C
=ξ
iI ·v=b
ρi
between the parity 0 and the parity 1 of the information bits over any PA string, v,
is bounded above by the following inequality:
SD(ρ0(v, ξ), ρ1(v, ξ)) ≤ 2r+1
√∑
|l|≥ vˆ
2
d2l , (D.3)
where vˆ is the minimum distance between v and the code C⊥, i.e. the minimum
weight of v ⊕ v′ for any v′ ∈ C⊥.
Proof The Shannon distinguishability between the parity 0 and the parity 1 is
bounded by the trace norm of ρ0(v, ξ) − ρ1(v, ξ), see [7,18]. Let us calculate
the required bound:
ρ0(v, ξ)− ρ1(v, ξ)
=
1
2n−(r+1)
∑
c∈C
(−1)(iξ⊕c)·v
∑
l,l′
(−1)(iξ⊕c)·(l⊕l′)dldl′ |ηˆl〉〈ηˆl′ |
=
1
2n−(r+1)
∑
l,l′
(∑
c∈C
(−1)(iξ⊕c)·(l⊕l′⊕v)
)
dldl′ |ηˆl〉〈ηˆl′ |
=
1
2n−(r+1)
∑
l,l′
(−1)iξ·(l⊕l′⊕v)
(∑
c∈C
(−1)c·(l⊕l′⊕v)
)
dldl′ |ηˆl〉〈ηˆl′ |
From equation (D.2) we know the sum over C is zero except when l ⊕ l′ ⊕ v ∈
C⊥ = Vr, i.e. when l′ = l ⊕ v ⊕ vs for some vs ∈ Vr. As a consequence:
ρ0(v, ξ)− ρ1(v, ξ) = 2
∑
vs∈Vr
(−1)iξ·vs
∑
l
dldl⊕v⊕vs |ηˆl〉〈ηˆl⊕v⊕vs |
As already said, the trace norm of this matrix serves as a bound on the information
Eve receives [7,18].
SD(ρ0(v, ξ), ρ1(v, ξ)) ≤ 1
2
Tr|ρ0(v, ξ)− ρ1(v, ξ)|
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Using the above and making use of the triangle inequality for the trace norm,
the following is obtained (whereSD(ρ0(v, ξ), ρ1(v, ξ)) is denoted SDv for short):
SDv ≤ Tr
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
vs∈Vr
(−1)iξ·vs
∑
l
dldl⊕v⊕vs |ηˆm〉〈ηˆm⊕v⊕vs |
∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
2
Tr
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
vs∈Vr
(−1)iξ·vs
∑
l
dldl⊕v⊕vs (|ηˆl〉〈ηˆl⊕v⊕vs |+ |ηˆl⊕v⊕vs〉〈ηˆl|)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
vs∈Vr
∑
l
dldl⊕v⊕vs(
1
2
Tr
∣∣∣ |ηˆl〉〈ηˆl⊕v⊕vs |+ |ηˆl⊕v⊕vs〉〈ηˆl| ∣∣∣ )
=
∑
vs∈Vr
∑
l
dldl⊕v⊕vs
√
1− [ℑ(〈ηˆl|ηˆl⊕v⊕vs〉)]2
≤
∑
vs∈Vr
∑
l
dldl⊕v⊕vs
where the sign ℑ means the imaginary part. In the above, we made use of the fact
that the trace norm is exactly computable for needed matrix. Now we will concern
ourselves with bounding each of the terms
∑
l dldl⊕ws , where ws = v ⊕ vs.∑
l
dldl⊕ws =
∑
|l|> |ws|
2
dldl⊕ws +
∑
|l|≤ |ws|
2
dldl⊕ws
=
∑
|l|> |ws|
2
dldl⊕ws +
∑
|l′⊕ws|≤ |ws|2
dl′⊕wsdl′
If |l′ ⊕ ws| ≤ |ws|2 then |ws| = |l′ ⊕ ws ⊕ l′| ≤ |l′ ⊕ ws|+ |l′| ≤ |ws|2 + |l′| and
so |l′| ≥ |ws|2 . Therefore,∑
|l|> |ws|
2
dldl⊕ws +
∑
|l′⊕ws|≤ |ws|2
dl′⊕wsdl′ ≤
∑
|l|≥ |ws|
2
dldl⊕ws +
∑
|l′|≥ |ws|
2
dl′⊕wsdl′
= 2
∑
|l|≥ |ws|
2
dldl⊕ws
=
1
α
∑
|l|≥ |ws|
2
2dl(αdl⊕ws )
≤ 1
α
∑
|l|≥ |ws|
2
[d2l + α
2d2l⊕ws ]
= α
∑
|l|≥ |ws|
2
d2l⊕ws +
1
α
∑
|l|≥ |ws|
2
d2l
where the last three steps are true for any real α, and real dl, dl⊕ws .
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Due to the fact that the d2l form a probability distribution, any sum of them is
less than or equal to unity.
∑
l
dldl⊕ws ≤ α+
1
α
∑
|l|≥ |ws|
2
d2l
≤ α+ 1
α
∑
|l|≥ vˆ
2
d2l
where vˆ = minvs |v⊕vs| (remember that ws = v⊕vs). Summing over all vs ∈ Vr
and setting α =
√∑
|l|≥ vˆ
2
d2l now leaves:
SDv ≤ 2r+1
√∑
|l|≥ vˆ
2
d2l (D.4)
⊓⊔
Following the proof of the above Lemma, one can guess that it is not a tight
bound since we sum over 2r terms while most of them do not contribute to the
sum (or contribute negligible values). This understanding led us to reach a tighter
bound.
D.2 Eve’s Information about one bit – Tight Bound
We will now make a finer analysis of Eve’s state after she learns the parity matrix
and parity string ξ. We start again from the equality:
|φiI 〉 =
∑
l
(−1)iI ·l|ηl〉 (D.5)
Let v1, . . . , vr be the rows of PC , and vr+1 = v. It is assumed that the sequence
v1, . . . , vr+1 is linearly independent; it can thus be extended to a basis v1, . . . , vn
of {0, 1}n. For any r′ let Vr′ be the span of {v1, . . . , vr′} and V cr′ be the span of
{vr′+1, . . . , vn}. For all r′, the spaces Vr′ and V cr′ are complementary; this means
that any element l ∈ {0, 1}n has a unique representation l = m⊕n with m ∈ V cr′
and n ∈ Vr′ .
For ξ ∈ {0, 1}r, let iξ denote some fixed n-bit string such that iξP⊤C = ξ
(existence is guaranteed by the fact that PC has maximal rank). For any iI ∈ Cξ
we have (iI − iξ)P⊤C = ξ − ξ = 0 and so iI − iξ ∈ C and thus, for any n ∈ Vr =
C⊥,(iI − iξ) · n = 0 i.e. iI · n = iξ · n.
Putting those remarks together we get:
|φiI 〉 =
∑
m∈V cr
∑
n∈Vr
(−1)iI ·(m⊕n)|ηm⊕n〉
=
∑
m∈V cr
(−1)iI ·m
∑
n∈Vr
(−1)iI ·n|ηm⊕n〉
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=
∑
m∈V cr
(−1)iI ·m
∑
n∈Vr
(−1)iξ·n|ηm⊕n〉
=
∑
m∈V cr
(−1)iI ·m|η′m〉
where η′m is defined, for each m ∈ Vr , by
|η′m〉 =
∑
n∈Vr
(−1)iξ·n|ηm⊕n〉 (D.6)
Let us write
η′m = d
′
mηˆ
′
m
with the ηˆ′ms normalized so that d′2m = 〈η′m|η′m〉, and the density matrix for |φiI 〉
reduces to:
ρiI = |φiI 〉〈φiI |
=
∑
m,m′∈V cr
(−1)iI ·(m⊕m′)d′md′m′ |ηˆ′m〉〈ηˆ′m′ |
Due to Proposition 4.1 (the orthogonality of the ηms), we get that
〈ηm⊕n1 |ηm⊕n2〉 = 0 except when n1 ⊕ n2 = 0. Together with Eq. (D.6) this
implies
d′2m =
∑
n∈Vr
d2m⊕n . (D.7)
Recall that the final key is computed as b = v · iI . Of course, Eve does not
know iI , but she knows v and she knows (from the announced ECC parity string
ξ) that iI ∈ Cξ = {iξ ⊕ c | c ∈ C}. Eve wants to determine b. For b ∈ {0, 1} the
reduced density matrix is
ρb(v, ξ) =
1
2n−(r+1)
∑
c∈C
(iξ⊕c)·v=b
ρiξ⊕c
=
1
2n−(r+1)
∑
c∈C
(iξ⊕c)·v=b
∑
m,m′∈V cr
(−1)(iξ⊕c)·(m⊕m′)d′md′m′ |ηˆ′m〉〈ηˆ′m′ |
We can now prove
Lemma 4.2 The Shannon distinguishability between the parity 0 and the parity 1
of the information bits over any PA string, v, is bounded above by the following
inequality:
SD(ρ0(v, ξ), ρ1(v, ξ)) ≤ 2
√∑
|l|≥ vˆ
2
d2l , (D.8)
where vˆ = dH(v, Vr) is the minimum weight of v ⊕ vs for any vs ∈ Vr.
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Proof The Shannon distinguishability between the parity 0 and the parity 1 is
bounded by the trace norm of ρ0(v, ξ)− ρ1(v, ξ):
ρ0(v, ξ)− ρ1(v, ξ) =
1
2n−(r+1)
∑
c∈C
(−1)(iξ⊕c)·v
∑
m,m′∈V cr
(−1)(iξ⊕c)·(m⊕m′)d′md′m′ |ηˆ′m〉〈ηˆ′m′ | =
1
2n−(r+1)
∑
m,m′∈V cr
(∑
c∈C
(−1)(iξ⊕c)·(m⊕m′⊕v)
)
d′md
′
m′ |ηˆ′m〉〈ηˆ′m′ | =
1
2n−(r+1)
∑
m,m′∈V cr
(−1)iξ·(m⊕m′⊕v)
(∑
c∈C
(−1)c·(m⊕m′⊕v)
)
d′md
′
m′ |ηˆ′m〉〈ηˆ′m′ |
Applying equality (D.2) the sum indexed by c is zero except when m⊕m′ ⊕ v ∈
C⊥ = Vr. But m ⊕ m′ ⊕ v ∈ V cr because m,m′ and v ∈ V cr . This implies
m⊕m′⊕v ∈ Vr∩V cr = {0} and thusm′ = m⊕v. Of course, withm⊕m′⊕v = 0,
the sum indexed by c is 2k = 2n−r and the coefficient (−1)iξ·(m⊕m′⊕v) is 1.
Therefore ρ0(v, ξ)− ρ1(v, ξ) takes the very simple form:
ρ0(v, ξ)− ρ1(v, ξ) = 2
∑
m∈V cr
d′md
′
m⊕v|ηˆ′m〉〈ηˆ′m⊕v| (D.9)
We now claim that
V cr = V
c
r+1 ∪ {m⊕ v | m ∈ V cr+1} (disjoint union) (D.10)
if dH(m,Vr) <
vˆ
2
then dH(m⊕ v, Vr) ≥ vˆ
2
for any m ∈ {0, 1}n (D.11)
Claim (D.10) follows from the fact that vr+1 = v, V cr is the span of {vr+1, . . . , vn}
and V cr+1 is the span of {vr+2, . . . , vn}, and that those elements are all linearly
independent. As for claim (D.11) if dH(m,Vr) < vˆ/2 and dH(m⊕ v, Vr) < vˆ/2,
then there is n and n′ in Vr such that |m⊕n| < vˆ/2 and |m⊕ v⊕n′| < vˆ/2. This
implies that |m⊕n⊕m⊕v⊕n′| < vˆ. Howeverm⊕n⊕m⊕v⊕n′ = n⊕n′⊕v
and n⊕ n′ ∈ Vr and this contradicts the fact that vˆ = dH(v, Vr)
Now, using claim (D.10), we can rewrite Eq (D.9):
ρ0(v, ξ)− ρ1(v, ξ) = 2
∑
m∈V c
r+1
d′md
′
m⊕v
{|ηˆ′m〉〈ηˆ′m⊕v |+ |ηˆ′m⊕v〉〈ηˆ′m|}
As usual, the trace norm of this matrix serves as a bound on the information Eve
receives. It is
SD(ρ0(v, ξ), ρ1(v, ξ)) ≤ 1
2
Tr|ρ0(v, ξ)− ρ1(v, ξ)|
Writing SDv instead of SD(ρ0(v, ξ), ρ1(v, ξ)) for short:
SDv ≤ Tr
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
m∈V c
r+1
d′md
′
m⊕v
{|ηˆ′m〉〈ηˆ′m⊕v|+ |ηˆ′m⊕v〉〈ηˆ′m|}
∣∣∣∣∣∣
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≤
∑
m∈V c
r+1
d′md
′
m⊕vTr
∣∣ |ηˆ′m〉〈ηˆ′m⊕v |+ |ηˆ′m⊕v〉〈ηˆ′m| ∣∣
=
∑
m∈V c
r+1
2d′md
′
m⊕v
√
1− [ℑ(〈ηˆ′m|ηˆ′m⊕v〉)]2
≤
∑
m∈V c
r+1
2d′md
′
m⊕v
where the sign ℑmeans the imaginary part. Now we wish to give a bound in terms
of the original values dl. Using the fact that for any α > 0 and any x, y (which are
real numbers), 0 ≤ (α 12x − α− 12 y)2 = αx2 + y2/α − 2xy, we get the general
inequality 2xy ≤ αx2 + 1αy2 and so
SDv ≤
∑
m∈V c
r+1
2d′md
′
m⊕v
≤
∑
m∈V c
r+1
dH(m,Vr)≥vˆ/2
2d′md
′
m⊕v +
∑
m∈V c
r+1
dH(m,Vr)<vˆ/2
2d′md
′
m⊕v
≤
∑
m∈V c
r+1
dH(m,Vr)≥vˆ/2
[
αd′2m⊕v +
1
α
d′2m
]
+
∑
m∈V c
r+1
dH(m,Vr)<vˆ/2
[
αd′2m +
1
α
d′2m⊕v
]
≤ α
∑
m∈V cr
d′2m +
1
α
∑
m∈V cr
dH(m,Vr)≥vˆ/2
d′2m by Eqs. (D.10,D.11)
≤ α
∑
l∈V cr ⊕Vr
d2l +
1
α
∑
m∈V cr ,n∈Vr
dH(m,Vr)≥vˆ/2
d2m⊕n by Eq. (D.7)
≤ α+ 1
α
∑
|l|≥ vˆ
2
d2l
Now we fix α =
√∑
|l|≥ vˆ
2
d2l and obtain:
SDv ≤ 2
√∑
|l|≥ vˆ
2
d2l (D.12)
⊓⊔
Note that vˆ = dH(v, Vr) where r is the number of parity check strings.
E Existence of Codes for Both Reliability and Security
Choosing a code which is good when n is large (for constant error rate) is not a
trivial problem in ECC. A Random Linear Code (RLC) is one such code, however,
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it does not promise us that the distances are as required, but only gives the desired
distances with probability as close to one as we want. With RLC, we find that the
threshold below which a secure key can be obtained is pallowed ≤ 7.56%.
In order to correct t errors with certainty, a code must have a minimal Ham-
ming distance between the code words d ≥ 2t+ 1 so that all original code words,
even when distorted by t errors, can still be identified correctly. For any cT which
passes the test, we are promised (due to Lemma 5.4) that the probability of having
t = |cI | > n(pallowed + ǫrel) errors is smaller than h = e− 12nǫ2rel .
Thus, we need to choose a RLC that promises a Hamming distance at least d
such that pallowed + ǫrel < t/n = d−12n , and then the t errors are corrected except
for a probability smaller than h = e− 12nǫ2rel . However, RLC can never promise a
specific minimal distance with certainty, but can only promise it with probability
exponentially close to one: For any n, r = n−k, and for δ such that H2(δ) < r/n,
an arbitrary random linear code (n, k, d) satisfies d/n ≥ δ, except for a probability
(see [19], Theorem 2.2)
P [d/n < δ] ≤ c(δ)√
n
2n(H2(δ)−r/n) ∆= g1 (E.1)
where c(δ) = 11−2δ
√
1−δ
2πδ .
If we choose δ = 2(pallowed+ǫrel)+1/n then we are promised that the errors are
corrected, except for some probability (bounded by h) that the error rate is larger
than expected, and some probability (bounded by g1) that a bad random code was
chosen.
Using such a code, ǫrel is now a function of δ so that ǫrel = δ/2 − 1/(2n) −
pallowed and therefore,
h = e−(n/8)(δ−
1
n
−2pallowed)2 (E.2)
and almost all such codes correct all the errors. One could conclude that the code
is reliable except for a probability g1 + h, but this is not the case here; although
the code is randomly produced, it can still be checked in advance, and used only if
it satisfies the condition on d. Thus the term g1 does not need to be added15 to the
reliability bound, and the bound is then given by h alone.
Recall that we choose ǫsec such that |v| ≥ 2n(pallowed + ǫsec). Let |v| be the
minimal distance between one PA string and any other parity check string (or linear
combination) taken from ECC and PA. Clearly, the Hamming weight of the dual
code of the ECC, once the PA is also added, provides a lower bound on |v|. Thus,
it is sufficient to demand d⊥ ≥ 2n(pallowed + ǫsec) in order to prove security.
Choosing a RLC for the ECC and PA, one cannot be completely sure that the
distance indeed satisfies the constraint, but this shall be true [19] with probability
exponentially close to one (and can be checked in advance). We use the dual code
15 We can still add the term g1 and this saves us the need to find the minimal distance of
the code.
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(n, r⊥, d⊥), where r⊥ = n− r −m. Such codes satisfy d⊥/n ≥ δ⊥, except for a
fraction of
P [d⊥/n < δ⊥] ≤ c(δ
⊥)√
n
2n(H2(δ
⊥)−(n−r−m)/n) = g2 (E.3)
with δ⊥ = 2(pallowed + ǫsec).
Assuming that Eve gets full information (namely, m bits) when the code fails
we get due to the above and Proposition 5.1
〈I′Eve〉 ≤ m
(
2e−
1
4
nǫ2sec + g2
)
(E.4)
but we can get rid of g2 by checking the code in advance16. If we demand that
H2(δ) − r/n < 0
H2(δ
⊥) + r/n+m/n− 1 < 0 ,
then both g1 and g2 are exponentially small. Written another way:
H2(2pallowed + 2ǫrel + 1/n) < r/n
H2(2pallowed + 2ǫsec) + r/n < 1− Rsecret
where Rsecret ≡ m/n.
In order to find the threshold on pallowed we combine these two equations to-
gether
H2(2pallowed + 2ǫsec) +H2(2pallowed + 2ǫrel + 1/n) < 1−Rsecret . (E.5)
In the limit of large n and the two ǫ’s close to zero, we get that pallowed < 5.50%
satisfies the bound and hence this is our threshold. [We can then chose the appro-
priate r/n so that both g1 and g2 functions are exponentially small.]
Asymptotically, a final key with a bit-rate Rsecret < 1−H2(2pa)−H2(2pa) is
secure and reliable for the given ECC+PA chosen at random. Note, as pa goes to
zero, Rsecret goes to 1, which means all the information bits are secret (asymptoti-
cally).
The above result can be improved (as noticed first by Mayers [27]) by taking
RLC with distance d = t+1 instead of d = 2t+1. Namely, d−1 ≥ n(pallowed+ǫrel)
(without the factor of 2). Due to Shannon’s bound [25] such a code can also correct
t = n(pallowed + ǫrel) errors with probability of failure smaller than δˆ (for any δˆ).
This is true provided that r/n > H2(pallowed + ǫrel), and that a sufficiently large n
is chosen, but we did not find an explicit connection between n and δˆ, as we did
with the other probabilities g1, g2, and h.
The above is true except for an exponentially small probability g′1 that the code
got the wrong distance [19], and an exponentially small probability h′ that the code
is fine yet there are more errors in the information bits than expected.
16 Or we can add that term to Eve’s information and this saves us the need to find the
minimal distance of the dual code.
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Choosing now δ = pallowed+ ǫrel+1/n, the term g′1 is still the same as before,
but with a different δ then before. The condition for g′1 to be exponentially small
becomes now
H2(pallowed + ǫrel + 1/n) < r/n .
The term h′ (telling us the probability of having more errors on the information
bits than expected from the test results) is
h′ = e−(n/2)(δ−
1
n
−pallowed)2 .
One could conclude that the code is reliable except for a probability g′1 + h′ + δˆ,
but (again) the term g′1 can be removed if we check the code in advance to make
sure it has the right distance. The bound is thus given by h′ + δˆ. However, we do
not have an exponentially small expression for δˆ (as a function of n) and it is only
known that we can render the error as small as we want by taking a sufficiently
large n.
For the security proof we choose ǫsec such that |v| ≥ 2n(pallowed + ǫsec), and
we demand d⊥ ≥ 2n(pallowed + ǫsec). Choosing a RLC for the ECC and PA, one
cannot be completely sure that the distance indeed satisfies the constraint, but this
shall be true with probability exponentially close to one (and can be checked in
advance). As before, we use the dual code (n, r⊥, d⊥), where r⊥ = n − r −m.
Such codes satisfy d⊥/n ≥ δ⊥, except for a fraction of
P [d⊥/n < δ⊥] ≤ c(δ
⊥)√
n
2n(H2(δ
⊥)−(n−r−m)/n) = g′2 (E.6)
with δ⊥ = 2(pallowed + ǫsec). As before, we can get rid of g′2 by checking the code
in advance.
In order for g′2 to be exponentially small we demand
H2(δ
⊥) + r/n+m/n− 1 < 0 ,
so finally:
H2(pallowed + ǫrel + 1/n) < r/n
H2(2pallowed + 2ǫsec) +H2(pallowed + ǫrel + 1/n) < 1−Rsecret
where Rsecret ≡ m/n.
In the limit of large n and ǫ’s close to zero, pallowed < 7.56% satisfies the bound
and hence this is our imporved threshold. With this threshold we have an explicit
bound on Eve’s information, but only an asymptotic bound for the probability of
failing in terms of reliability.
